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T he w ord “offset” in the broad sense represents reciprocal trade advantages that 
result from economic agreements. However, as a result of increasing competition among 
suppliers due to the reduced global defense market, declining military budgets, and other 
aspects, buyers are able to influence the conditions under which major defense programs 
are obtained. Not only unions, defense industries, trade associations, and public, but also 
EU is involved. The Czech Republic as a member of these organizations has to follow 
their rules as well, and their views and policies regarding offsets might be different. The 
objective of this project is to examine what issues, if any, the Czech Republic faces 
concerning offsets implementation in international trade. This study will discuss briefly 
the history of the C zech R epublic‟s participation in offsets, and its current policy, if any, 
tow ards using offset practices. T he C zech R epublic‟s goals in offset practices, and 
government support for them, would be another area of research. The Czech Republic is 
an EU member and therefore is obliged to follow policies implemented by these 
institutions. Whether there is any connection between the Czech government policy and 
EU policies will also be examined. Specifically, the project will focus on what should be 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this project is to examine what issues, if any, the Czech Republic 
faces concerning offsets implementation in global defense market.  Defining offsets in 
international trade and its purpose right at the outset of this study will enhance its 
understanding.  A brief history of the Czech Republic (CR) participation in offsets, and 
its current policy, if any, towards using offset practices will be traced as the next step.  
The Czech Republic is an EU, member and therefore is obliged to follow policies 
implemented by these institutions.  Whether there is any connection between the Czech 
government policy and EU policies will also be examined.  Specifically, the project will 
focus on what should be done in future offsets implementation, and what interested 
parties must be aware of. 
B. BACKGROUND 
T he w ord “offset” in the broad sense represents reciprocal econom ic advantages 
that result from trade agreements. Currently, however, as a result of increasing 
competition among suppliers due to the reduced global defense market, and declining 
military budgets, buyers are able to influence the conditions under which major defense 
programs are obtained.  Therefore, the word offset is used predominantly in a sense of the 
variety of industrial, commercial and political arrangements under which foreign 
suppliers implement specific policy aim ed at partially or fully com pensating the buyer‟s 
procurement cost.  Nowadays, most buyers, including the Czech Republic, demand these 
concession in full for the direct cost of procuring major defense programs.  
Offsets vary with the type of trade.  Attempts to improve economic infrastructure, 
health service, and social aspects of a particular country are usually seen behind the 
implementation of various offsets.  Fulfillment of offset agreements is usually achieved 
through various projects implemented in the buying country, very often together with 
third parties, and often in the form of technological transfer, and license.  These projects 
also offer the possibility of global expansion for small businesses. 
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As mentioned above, it is obvious that offsets are linked with global economic 
trade.  At least on the contractual side, offsets serve as a national benefit; however, as is 
obvious from what is happening with the purchase of supersonic aircraft for the Czech 
Armed Forces, the governments of various supplying companies also put forth intensive 
effort for their own self-interest.  This is mainly because offset programs are usually 
implemented in business areas related to national security, and this remains a state 
domain.  
Short term offsets, however, need not only provide benefits for the buying 
country. In cases where an agreement is made only for a certain period of time (for 
example, until the delivery of the last equipment), the supplying country may make only 
a short-term investment or order a huge amount of goods only once.  That of course may, 
for example, reduce unemployment rates for a short period of time, but when the 
investors leave the country the previous problems re-occur in the same or even worse 
measure.  So in this case a systematic approach to lowering unemployment without any 
relation to offset programs would be more fruitful.  Offsets offered by defense industries 
of small countries can raise doubts as well, in a sense, whether they really enable access 
to global markets in branches not related to their business.  Moreover, there is a threat 
posed by incompletely transparent agreements with third parties, in that they can add to 
the final results of offset investment, which would be realized even without offsets.  
Therefore, sometimes reciprocal purchasing of military technology is preferred over 
offsets (for example, F-18 aircraft assembled under license by Patria Industries in Finland 
for the Finish Air Force). 
In addition to the buying government and seller, there are a wide variety of 
stakeholders involved to some degree with offsets and their implementation.  Not only 
unions, defense industries, trade associations, and the public, but also EU is involved.  
The Czech Republic, as a member of these organizations, has to follow their rules as 
well, and their views and policies regarding offsets might be different. 
Some strongly support offsets implementation as indispensable to doing business 
in the current global market.  Others view offsets as an inevitable obstacle.  Given these 
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views, offsets are quite controversial. Some areas of controversy might be: transactional 
cost to implement offset, negative effects on unemployment, and security issues.  
The objective of this project is to examine what issues, if any, the Czech Republic 
faces concerning offsets implementation in international trade.  This study will discuss 
briefly the history of the C zech R epublic‟s participation in offsets, and its current policy, 
if any, towards using offset practices.  What Czech goals are in offset practices, and 
w hether the governm ent‟s actions support them , w ould be another area of research.  T he 
Czech Republic is a member of EU, and therefore is obliged to follow policies 
implemented by this institution.  Whether there is any connection between the Czech 
government policy and EU policies will also be examined.  The project will then focus 
upon considerations in future offsets implementation. 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to determine what issues the Czech Republic 
faces concerning offsets implementation in defense market.  This study will look at the 
development of offsets in the Czech Republic, its participation in such trade practices, 
and current policies towards using offsets.  
Foreign policy goals and support for EU policies will be discussed in order to find 
connection between the Czech Republic and EU concerning offset practices.  
Additionally, this research examines what to be aware of, and if there is anything 
to be done in future offsets implementation.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Principal Research Question 
What issues does the Czech Republic face concerning offsets implementation in 
international trade in the context of military purchases? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 W hat is the history of the C zech R epublic‟s participation in offsets?  
 Does the Czech government policy support offsets? 
 Are there considerations for future offsets. 
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E. SCOPE 
This research is designed to provide a basic understanding of offsets in 
international trade in the context of military purchases, and to evaluate the impact of 
using such practices.  Additionally, this research will address a brief history of the Czech 
Republic‟s participation in offsets, its current policies, if any, tow ard using such 
practices, and connection between the Czech government policy and EU policies. 
In identifying the elements of Czech government and EU offset policies this 
research will trace a number of other points associated with offsets, such as advantages 
and disadvantages of offsets, realization of offsets cost, study of different types of offset 
arrangements, and identifying countries that participate in offsets.  This study will use the 
Czech R epublic‟s, as w ell as som e other countries‟, exam ples and experiences. 
This study will not attempt to evaluate or determine the real impact of using offset 
practices, but will rather provide general conclusions on their effects, possible 
recommendations, and issues to be aware of.    
F. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for research used in this thesis includes literature reviews and a 
review of documents produced by the Czech Government and international organizations 
related to offsets.  These documents will be analyzed to examine what issues, if any, the 
Czech Republic faces concerning offsets in the context of military purchases, and to 
identify current Czech/EU policies towards offsets in international trade.  Documents 
from offices within the executive branch of the Czech Government, studies or regulations 
issued by the MoD and Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT), MoD policy and 
regulations relating to acquisition and foreign sales, and documents from the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and European Union (EU) were also consulted.  
Many interviews, as appropriate, were conducted during the research for this 
thesis, including with MoD personnel. 
G.  ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II provides a background for better understanding of offsets in the context 
of military purchases in international trade.  A definition of offsets for this thesis is 
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provided, characteristics of offsets are identified, different types of direct and indirect 
offset agreements explained, and various terms and definitions applied to offsets are 
reviewed.  The international trade principles are outlined, and the purpose for using 
offsets explained. 
C hapter III discusses the C zech R epublic‟s history in offset-related activities since 
1993, after a so-called “velvet divorce” of C zechoslovakia‟s tw o national com ponents, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The volume of transactions and countries involved in 
offsets is included in this chapter to gain a broader view of offsets implementation. This 
chapter will also provide an overall summary of offset policy development. 
Chapter IV examines the issues the Czech Republic faces concerning offsets and 
international trade, if any. The Czech Republic joined EU in 2004; therefore this chapter 
also discusses any possible connection among EU and the Czech R epublic‟s policies.   
The author of this study suggests the use of these significant dates as a mechanism to help 
understanding of the development of offsets policy and practice within the Czech 
Government. 
Chapter V provides a summary and conclusions regarding the issues the Czech 
Republic faces concerning offsets in the context of military purchases and international 
trade. This chapter draws conclusion from the analysis and provides recommendations 
regarding changes in Czech Government policy and practices towards offsets. This 





































II. OFFSETS IN THE CONTEXT OF MILITARY PURCHASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II provides a background for better understanding of offsets in the context 
of military purchases in international trade.  A definition of offsets for this thesis is 
provided, characteristics of offsets are identified, different types of direct and indirect 
offset agreements explained, and various terms and definitions applied to offsets are 
reviewed.  The international trade principles are outlined, and the purpose for using of 
offsets explained.   
B. OFFSETS 
The term offsets is used in defense sales to mean the compensation given to 
foreign buyers to offset the economic impact on them from having purchased items made 
in foreign countries, rather than domestically-produced items.  It is designed to reduce the 
massive expenditure needed for military purchases, ensure that some of the money paid 
out by the government (in some cases by the Armed Forces) is offset by an influx of 
foreign investment (e.g., Gripen International undertook to perform in the Czech 
Republic offset programs valued at 130 percent of the contract value of CZK 19.650 
billion; approximately USD 0.9 billion)1.  Countertrade is an immense, pervasive 
business practice, involving huge numbers of people, and stretching far beyond the 
military market.  
The literature on offsets in the context of military purchases, as well as offsets 
generally, is overwhelmed with various terms: direct and indirect offsets, countertrade, 
bilateral government trade, compensatory arrangements, clearing arrangements, simple 
and multiple barter, coproduction, licensed production, overseas investment, buy-backs, 
and technology transfer.2  Some of the most important term definitions are outlined in 
this chapter. 
                                                 
1 M inistry of D efense, “A greem ents on the G ripen L ease for the C zech A rm ed F orces,” 
http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=3567 (accessed July 2, 2006). 
2 Stephanie Neuman, "Coproduction, Barter, and Countertrade: Offsets in the International Arms 
Market," (Orbis, 1985), 29. 
 8 
1. The Meaning of Offsets, Definitions and Terminology    
Offsets have served important foreign policy and national security objectives, 
such as increasing the industrial capabilities of allied countries, standardizing military 
equipment, and modernizing allied forces.  The use of offsets is now commonplace.  
Countries require offsets for a variety of reasons: to ease the burden of large defense 
purchases on their economy, to increase or preserve domestic employment, to obtain 
desired technology, and to promote targeted industrial sectors. They may include 
agreements by the seller to purchase from local suppliers with some connection to the 
buyer, agreements to invest in production or other facilities in geographical proximity to 
the buyers, or agreements by the seller to meet certain performance targets (e.g., export 
requirements) or undertake other related activities (e.g., countertrade) on behalf of the 
buyer. One can even point to certain transactions that might be regarded as ''reverse 
offsets," with the vendor reducing price or providing additional services in exchange for 
commitments by the buyer that would not normally be part of a "straight" sale (for 
example, agreement by aircraft vendors to reduce prices in exchange for buyer 
agreements to exclusively purchase their product over some future period). 
The US is the biggest offset provider.3  Some nations, like Germany and the UK 
are both offset providers and receivers. But most of the other countries, like the Czech 
Republic, are the offset receivers.  The academic literature and government documents 
provide a variety of definitions. This study will look at some of these definitions.  
a. The C zech  G overn m en t’s D efin ition s an d In terpretation  of 
Terms 
Countries use different terms to describe their offset programs.  In Finland 
defense offsets are often called counterpurchases or industrial participation (IP), and in 
Sweden offsets are referred to as industrial cooperation (IC) or industrial participation 
(IP).4 The intention there was to emphasize the cooperative aspect of offsets and long-
                                                 
3 According to the US Bureau Industry and Security –  Offsets in Defense Trade www.bis.doc.gov 
(accessed July 15, 2006).  
4 Elisabeth S köns, “E valuating D efense O ffsets: T he E xperience in F inland and S w eden,” chapter 10 
in J. Brauer and J.P. Dunne (eds.) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in 
Arms Trade Offsets (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 149. 
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term business relations and activities as opposed to short-term transactions.  The Czech 
Republic uses the term  “Industrial C ooperation P rogram ”.5  The Industrial Cooperation 
Program (ICP) is a tool of economic compensations of expenditures of the state incurred 
in connection with purchases of equipment, material and services, in particular for 
defense and security purposes, and financed from the state budget of the Czech Republic.  
The ICP applies to the acquisition of equipment, material, and services from a foreign 
contractor and whose aggregate value exceeds CZK 500 million (approximately USD 23 
million), or w here a foreign subcontractor‟s contract signed w ith a dom estic prim e 
contractor exceeds the value of CZK 250 million (approximately USD 11.4 million). 
The Value of the Program is generally understood as the amount of the contract price, 
and becomes a so-called Offset Commitment Value at the moment the contract has been 
signed. The Czech Government authorizes an interdepartmental commission to define 
offset requirements in the course of preparations of tenders for state contracts.  This offset 
commission is appointed by the Minister of Industry and Trade for the purpose of 
coordinating activities and steps related to preparations, negotiations, enforcement, 
evaluation, implementation, and auditing of the program.  The commission consist of 
four representatives of the MIT, two representatives each of the MoD and Ministry of 
Interior (MI), and one representative each for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
Ministry of Finance (MF), Ministry of Environment (ME), Ministry of Regional 
Development (MRD), Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA), Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS), Ministry of Agriculture (MA), and Office of the 
Government of the Czech Republic (OGCR).  However, additional experts from other 
ministries or institutions, or bidders for public contracts can be invited as well. 
The negotiated agreement between the two parties that stipulates that the 
exporter will complete a certain amount of offset work within a specific time period is 
called an offset agreement (OA; e.g., Agreement on Industrial Cooperation Program,6 
through which Gripen International undertakes to perform in the Czech Republic), while 
                                                 
5 S ee “A nnex 1 of A ction D ocum ent N o. 3/2005” of the M inistry of T rade and Industry.  
6 These agreements provide for elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports of 
industrial goods, reciprocal concessions, and a prohibition against the introduction of new duties 
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the actual delivery of the offset work by the exporter (e.g., placement of a specific 
contract) is called an offset transaction (OT). There are basically four different types of 
offset transaction:  
 Transfer of technologies and know-how, support of research and 
development (R&D) 
 Direct foreign investment 
 Export promotion 
 Other projects 
The economic benefits of the Czech partner, which result from the 
implementation of the transaction, are called the Offset Transaction Value (OTV).  There 
are many ways of quantifying the OTV (e.g., as direct foreign investment OT is 
concerned, as revenues generated by the Czech partner as a direct consequence of the OT, 
minus material and services purchased abroad).   
The term Direct Offset means offset projects related directly to the subject 
matter of the public contract, and should account for at least 20 percent of the purchase 
price (e.g., exactly 20 percent of the Swedish investment in the Gripen Program was 
directed immediately into the Czech Defense and Aviation Industry CDAI).7  All other 
ICP (i.e., those consisting of the involvement of domestic companies in projects related to 
activities of the bidder, or bidder‟s subcontractors) are called indirect offsets.8   
                                                                                                                                                 
supplemented with exception mechanisms, such as safeguarding or antidumping. 
7 E xam ples of real im plem entation of G ripen program ‟s direct offsets:  
- Aerospace (Hydraulic cylinder for JAS-39 Gripen, Jihlavan Co., value of CZK 10.3 million) 
- Ammunition components (Cellulose Nitrate for BAE Systems, Aliachem Co., value of CZK 68.5 
million) 
- Naval material (Steel for the Royal Navy ships, Vitkovice Steel Co., value of CZK 108.5 million) 
For more information see www.army.cz accessed June 24, 2006.  
8 E xam ples of real im plem entation of G ripen program ‟s indirect offsets: 
- Heavy industry in total of CZK 1847.5 million (Smithy equipment for Saudi Arabia, PSJ 
Novotech Co., value of CZK 189.5 million) 
- Automotive industry in total of CZK 674.8 million (Brake discs for export, BAK Co., value of 
534,1 million) 
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b. Academic Definitions of Offsets 
There are many academic definitions of offsets, such as:  
“O ffsets, coproduction, barter, and countertrade are com pensatory trade 
agreements –  agreements that incorporate some method of reducing the amount of 
foreign exchange needed to buy a military item or some means of creating revenue to 
help pay for it.”9  Indeed, the foreign exchange can play a significant role (e.g., the 
Gripen Program uses a fixed price contract, and will not be subject to any future 
exchange rate fluctuation.  Taking into consideration the extremely good Czech economy 
in recent years, the strengthening of the Czech currency and other related factors this 
could be a major hit).10   
“… an offset occurs when the supplier places work to an agreed value with 
firms in buying country, over and above what it would have bought in the absence of the 
offset.”11 
“O ffsets are sim ply goods and services w hich form  elem ents of com plex 
voluntary transactions negotiated between governments as purchasers and foreign 
suppliers… they are those goods and services on w hich a governm ent chooses to place the 
label „offsets‟… .”12 
“… an offset is a contract im posing perform ance conditions on the seller of 
a good or service so that the purchasing government can recoup, or offset, some of its 
                                                                                                                                                 
- Electronics/electrical industry in total of CZK 1504.2 million (Electric tools for export, AEG 
Electric Tools Co., value of 423.1 million) 
For more information see www.army.cz accessed June 24, 2006. 
9 S tephanie N eum an, “O ffsets in the International A rm s M arket,” (O rbis, 1985), 183.  
10 On Monday, June 14, 2004, a set of agreements were entered into and signed at the Czech Ministry 
of Defense by the Czech Republic and the Kingdom of Sweden on the lease of JAS-39 Gripen supersonic 
fighter aircraft to be operated by the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. The exchange rate at that time 
was EUR 1 to CZK 31.145. Today, the exchange rate is EUR 1 to CZK 28.4. (Exchange rates taken from 
the Czech National Bank websites at www.cnb.cz, accessed June 24, 2006).   
11 S tephen M artin and K eith H artley, “U K  F irm s‟ E xperience and P erceptions of D efense O ffsets: 
S urvey R esults”, D efense and P eace E conom ics, 1995, p. 5. 
12 Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne, Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and 
Cases in Arms Trade Offsets (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 4. 
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investment.  In some way, reciprocity beyond that associated with normal market 
exchange of goods and services is involved.”13 
There are as many different definitions as authors.  These various 
definitions have a lot in common.  The author of this thesis decided to use the following 
w orking definition of offsets: “A n offset program  is a tool of econom ic com pensation of 
expenditures of the state incurred during purchases of equipment, material and services, 
in particular for defense and security purposes.”    
2. Characteristics of Offsets 
Although the offset policies vary among states there are some common 
characteristics.  These characteristics are provided below. 
Table 1.   Characteristics of Offsets 
1. Importing countries usually mandate offset requirements by law, often to more than 
100 percent14 of the contract value. 
2. Offset requirements kick in for minimum contract value,15 sometimes as low as USD 
5 million. 
3. Multipliers16 are frequently attached to offset deals. 
4. Practically most defense trade contracts now contain clauses that subject defense 
exporters to a variety of penalties for non-fulfillment of offset commitments (e.g., 
exclusion from consideration for future contracts in the Czech Republic). 
5. It must be a new cooperation project with quantifiable and provable economic effects 
                                                 
13 Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne, Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and 
Cases in Arms Trade Offsets (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 3. 
14 In the Czech Republic the compensation to constitute at least 100 percent of the contract value 
(Decree of the Government of the CR No. 9 of January 5, 2005 on Principles on Implementation of ICP). 
15 The Czech Republic sets the limit at CZK 500 million (approximately USD 23 million) for direct 
deliveries, or CZK 250 million (approximately USD 11.4 million) for sub-deliveries. 
16 “Multipliers are incentives used by purchasing countries to stimulate particular types of offset 
transactions. Prime contractors receive added credit toward their obligation above the actual value of the 
transaction when multipliers are used. In a small number of cases, a negative multiplier is used to 
discourage certain types of offsets. In Europe, 83 percent of transactions (by number) have no multiplier 
involved for the prime contractor when fulfilling the offset com m itm ent.” T his is taken from  D IS AM 
Journal  June 22, 2005, p. 34.   
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for the purchasing country. 
6. Economic results of the implementation of a specific offset transaction may be 
credited to just one program. 
Furthermore, there are many expectations. Some of them are depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Offsets Expectations 
1. Offsets will reduce defense acquisition costs. 
2. Offsets will initiate positive changes in employment levels, especially in the 
purchasing country. 
3. Offset will result in a strengthening of the acquiring country‟s econom y by transfers 
of capital in the form of direct foreign investments, with an emphasis on improving 
the competitive ability of advanced industrial sectors and services. 
4. Offsets result in advanced technologies (e.g., environmental) and know-how 
transfers. 
5. Offsets will help in the development of small and medium-sized businesses. 
Unfortunately, components absent in these offset characteristics are auditing, 
feedback, and offset contract monitoring. Not many countries have ever carried out 
formal and independent offset contract audits to determine to what degree, if any, the 
hopes with which offset contracts are invested come to success. Later, this paper 
discusses issues connected with these facts. 
3. Government Involvement in Offsets 
There are many reasons why governments get involved in offsets. The author 
decided to examine the most fundamental reasons: 
Jobs and Export - In economies where government has a major influence on the 
behavior of certain sectors (because of public ownership or regulation), governments are 
frequently tempted to impose formal/informal offset requirements on procurement from 
abroad that are linked to politically popular goals like jobs or export creation. 
 14 
Defense Base - In all countries, defense purchases are undertaken by the 
government with a major goal; national security.  Transactions involving domestic and 
foreign defense firms (and non-defense goods and services with defense applications) are 
scrutinized and shaped by all governments to reflect their perceived national security 
interests. In today's international system, national security often has an explicit economic 
component, such as protecting or stimulating the defense-industrial base. However, in 
many parts of the world, national security is seen as synonymous over time with 
industrial strength and national technological capability.  
Industrial Policy - Governments often intervene to improve the terms of 
bargaining between national industry and foreign investors. Clear restrictions and a 
government-run approval process for foreign investment and access to local markets can 
be used to reduce or minimize competition among domestic customers in negotiations 
with foreign sellers, or otherwise increase the bargaining power of the domestic players.  
The restrictions are designed to improve the terms on which foreign goods and services 
are purchased.  
Public Funding of Research and Development (R&D) - Governments sometimes 
fund a major portion of the R&D going into defense.  While private firms are probably 
best equipped to secure the deals that capture the maximum return on private investments 
in new technology, the same may not hold true when it comes to securing the maximum 
national return on public investments in new technology.  
Trade Issues - Offsets might be regarded as a form of subsidy to exports.  There 
are restrictions17 on subsidies and pricing behavior in international trade that discipline 
the use of such subsidies, and governments therefore are interested in offsets as a trade 
issue in sectors where they may be used to promote exports by national companies. The 
defense sector is unique in this regard, in that the national defense exception exempts 
defense goods and services from some of the effects of these disciplines. Indeed, one 
might even argue that what might be labeled as "dumping" is routine practice in 
international sales of defense articles. 
                                                 
17 W orld T rade O rganization, “S C M : O verview  of P rohibited S ubsidies,” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto04/wto4_28.htm (accessed June 18, 2006). 
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C. TRADE 
Everyone involved in trade has to know as much as possible about the principals 
and conditions of trade.  Trade and trade policies have always played key roles in the 
development of the Czech economy and society as a whole.  The importance of trade is 
reflected in the openness of the economy, its profile and the high share of imports and 
exports of merchandise and services in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).18 Due to its 
(trade) importance, this section examines briefly the fundamental principles of trade. 
1. Free Trade Principles 
According to the World Trade Organization, there are five fundamental principles 
of trade. They are that trading should be: a) without discrimination, b.) free, c.) 
predictable, d.) more competitive, and e.) more beneficial for developing countries.19   
a. Without Discrimination 
It sounds almost like a cliché.  People very often talk about all kinds of 
discrimination.  However, it is important to bear in mind that countries should not 
discriminate among their trading partners.  All must be treated equally.  The importance 
of non-discrimination is immense and therefore also a part of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Those 
agreements rule the trade in goods and the Czech Republic considers these in its trading 
Activities.   
The real world is not always perfect, nor is trade.  There are some 
examples of discrimination, meaning allowed discrimination. For example, the Czech 
Armed Forces sets up agreements only with Czech companies.20  So obviously the Czech 
Republic does not treat others (foreigners) as its own nationals.  
                                                 
18 T he C zech R epublic‟s G D P  (constant prices) in the second quarter of 2006 w as approxim ately C Z K  
708.8 billion, of which CZK 636.9 billion represents export of goods and services, and CZK 641.8 billion 
stands for import (http://www.czso.cz/csu/csu.nsf/dataprommf?readform accessed September 18, 2006). 
19 W orld T rade O rganization, “P rinciples of the T rading S ystem ,” 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (accessed  June 18, 2006). 
20 Perfect example would be the medium off-road trucks that are the most prevalent category of 
ground equipment within the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. The Ministry of Defense of the Czech 
Republic made the decision to procure new TATRA medium off-road trucks, of Czech manufacture, in July 
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b. Freer Trade 
Free trade allows all nations to live freer and more prosperous lives. Trade 
with other nations benefits consumers with lower prices and more choice, while 
producers gain export markets, new technology and lower-cost inputs. Export-related 
jobs usually pay more and are growing faster than non-export jobs.  Free trade among 
nations increases global prosperity by allowing people to specialize in what they produce 
relatively more efficiently.  More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith argued that it 
would be foolish for a family to insist on making its own shoes, tailoring its own clothes, 
and growing all its own food when it could buy them more cheaply from the shoemaker, 
tailor, and farm er. “W hat is prudence in the conduct of every private fam ily, can scarce 
be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity 
cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the 
produce of our ow n industry, em ployed in a w ay in w hich w e have som e advantage.”21  
Countries should negotiate lower trade barriers such as custom duties and import bans to 
encourage trade.  A lthough industrial countries‟ tariff rates on industrial goods have 
fallen steadily, there is still a lot to be done.   
c. Predictability 
 Investment in various countries (especially the developing countries) is 
more encouraged when countries are stable and predictable.  Consequently, new jobs are 
created and people can enjoy the benefits of competition, mainly choice and lower price.  
Of the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
Czech Republic has one of the most developed and industrialized economies. The Czech 
Republic has a well-educated population and a well-developed infrastructure. The 
country's strategic location in Europe, low-cost structure, and skilled work force has 
                                                                                                                                                 
2005. S ince the truck‟s specifications are in accordance w ith C zech and E uropean law s that define strategic 
military material (The author of this thesis does not share the same opinion), the supplier was chosen 
without public tender. Acquisition of the trucks was approved by the Czech government on September 21, 
2005 (www.army.cz accessed June 18, 2006). The new trucks will replace old Praga V3S trucks, also of 
Czech make, and other Soviet trucks, whose ages are over 30 years. 
 
21 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern 
Library, 1937), p. 424. 
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attracted strong inflows of foreign direct investment. This investment is rapidly 
modernizing its industrial base and increasing productivity.  As a small, open economy in 
the heart of Europe, economic growth is strongly influenced by demand for Czech 
exports and flows of foreign direct investment. 
The "Velvet Revolution" in 1989 offered a chance for profound and 
sustained economic reform. Signs of economic resurgence began to appear in the wake of 
the shock therapy that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) labeled the "big bang" of 
January 1991. Since then, astute economic management has led to the elimination of 95% 
of all price controls, large inflows of foreign investment, increasing domestic 
consumption and industrial production, and a stable exchange rate. Exports to former 
communist economic bloc markets have shifted to Western Europe. Thanks to foreign 
investment, the country enjoys a positive balance-of-payments position. Despite a general 
trend over the last 10 years toward rising budget deficits, the Czech Government's 
domestic and foreign indebtedness remains relatively low.  















Total State Debt 
(CZK billion) 592.9 643.6 662.6 691.2 698.2 728.9 
The government has offered investment incentives in order to enhance the 
Czech Republic's natural advantages, thereby attracting foreign partners and stimulating 
the economy.  The Czech Republic has made significant progress toward creating a stable 
and attractive climate for investment, although continuing reports of corruption are 




                                                 
22 M inistry of F inance of the C zech R epublic, “C zech R epublic‟s S tate D ebt P aram eters at the E nd of 
June 2006,” June 18, 2006, www.mfcr.cz. 
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d. Competition 
P rom oting open, fair, and undistorted com petition should be in everyone‟s 
best interest. Unfair practices such as export subsidies and dumping products at below 
cost to gain market share ought to be discouraged.  
e. Encouraging Development and Economic Reform 
Trade should be more beneficial for less developed countries, providing 
them with more time to adjust, greater flexibility, and extra privileges.23      
2. Trade Description 
Trade involves the exchange of goods and services between nations. Goods can 
be defined as finished products, as intermediate goods used in producing other goods, or 
as agricultural products and foodstuffs. International trade enables a nation to specialize 
in those goods it can produce most cheaply and efficiently. Trade also enables a country 
to consume more than it would be able to produce if it depended only on its own 
resources. Finally, trade enlarges the potential market for the goods of a particular 
economy. Trade has always been the major force behind the economic relations among 
nations. 
Peoples' views of international trade are complex and cannot be explained as a 
simple preference for free trade or protectionism. A strong majority of the population 
views trade, in principle, as something positive and having significant benefits for the 
country‟s econom y. H ow ever, the m ajority also has m ajor reservations about how  trade 
has been put into practice. There is a strong concern that, though trade has benefited 
business and the wealthy, it has not benefited workers and has widened the gap between 
rich and poor. People also show concern that trade has been harmful to the 
environment24, to international labor standards, and to poor countries (against free trade 
principles).   
                                                 
23 The Czech Republic is a fully developed country (T he W orld B ank‟s official graduation of the 
C zech R epublic from  “developing” to “developed” country w as on F ebruary 28, 2006), and yet is using 
those privileges. 
24 F or m ore discussion of these issues, see D uncan B rack, “B alancing trade and the environm en t”, 
International Affairs 71:3, July 1995; and Dan Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the 
Future (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994). 
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a. Benefits of Trade 
A strong belief in the theoretical benefits of trade predicted by economists 
reinforces this general support for freer trade. People respond favorably to the idea that 
increased trade means increased or improved product selection. Free trade leads to better 
products becoming available in trading countries. Most of the population recognizes the 
positive effect on prices for consumer products. It must be noted, however, that when the 
value of lower consumer prices is paired off against job creation or job security, a 
majority favors the latter. Another reason people have supported trade is their general 
sense that trade promotes good relations between countries. Freer trade makes the world 
more stable by putting people from different countries in contact with each other.  
b. Legal Framework for the International Trade in the CR 
The Czech Republic as a member of various organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization, European Union, and Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development therefore has to follow rules and regulations of these 
organizations. 
The Czech Republic incorporated into its legislation all relevant 
provisions of the WTO Agreements, including those dealing with protection of domestic 
industries against increased imports, subsidized imports or dumping.25 
Import licensing procedures are regulated under the Act No. 62/2000 that 
is fully consistent with the appropriate provisions of the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures. Following the Act 62/2000, the Government has adopted a decree that 
defines a list of products that can only be imported or exported against a license.  
In the areas of investment and competition, the Czech Republic‟s support 
for negotiations is motivated by its specific experience as a country that has completely 
restructured its system of ownership rights and deregulated its former centrally planned 
economy. Foreign direct investments, on which WTO negotiations should focus, have 
played a key role in the process of economic transformation, and their importance for 
                                                 
25 Act No. 152/1997 Coll., On Protection against the Import of a Dumping Product; Act No. 62/2000 
Coll., On Some Measures in the Export or Import of Products and the Licensing Procedures; and Act No. 
63/2000 Coll., On Protection against Subsidized Imports. 
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further development of the economy is continuously growing. This explains why the 
Czech Republic is committed to creating a stable contractual framework that will provide 
a transparent, predictable and legally certain environment for foreign investors and 
concurrently will not undermine the regulatory powers of governments to pursue their 
legitimate economic objectives.  
In the area of competition, negotiations should aim at a framework 
agreement based on the principles of non-discrimination (national treatment and most-
favored nation approach) and transparency, while fully respecting the development 
objectives. It should focus on prevention of anti-competitive practices having 
international dimension and hampering market access, and should promote co-operation 
among national competition authorities.  
c. Trade Barriers 
There are many examples of trade barriers that companies may face in the 
context of their international businesses. Restrictions on sales (in particular export 
markets), difficulties in acquiring patent rights in foreign countries, and discriminatory 
taxes when selling goods abroad are among some of the trade barriers. Restrictive or 
unfair foreign regulations may have negative effects on exporting goods, providing 
services or protecting intellectual property, especially in European countries that are not 
EU members.   
To overcome trade barriers and help businesses to develop their activities 
overseas, the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR) was adopted by the European Union.26  
The TBR was specifically designed to address the issues in third world countries, and to 
tackle unfair foreign trade practices that cause harm within the EU internal market. The 
main reason for adopting the TBR was the fact that EU companies alone could do little to 
tackle foreign government measures that negatively impacted their businesses. Therefore, 
the EU developed the TBR as an instrument to provide direct access to the European 
                                                 
26 Council Regulation (European Commission) No 3286/94, December 22, 1994, describing 
Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the 
C om m unity‟s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the 
WTO.  
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Commission (EC), which can then investigate the issue and pursue the elimination or 
rem oval of the disputed “obstacles to trade.”27   
                                                 
27 According to TBR, an obstacle to trade is “any trade practice adopted or m aintained by a third 
country in respect of w hich international trade rules establish a right of action.”  International trade rules 
are those primarily established under the auspices of WTO, such as the multilateral agreements on trade in 
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III. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF OFFSETS IN THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
National defense is believed to be very important for all countries. Research and 
development, as well as the procurement of modern defense systems are inevitable. 
However, not all countries have an industry that is capable of manufacturing these 
systems. Therefore, most nations purchase advanced systems abroad. 
New opportunities for the Czech Republic and specifically its national defense 
industry were brought after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Despite a difficult period of 
transition in Czech industry, industry observers felt the Czech military industry was ready 
to expand. After seeing its military sales figures and employment levels steadily decrease 
for much of the last decade, Czech officials hoped to recapture the nation‟s tradition of 
military manufacturing. Although NATO officials have recommended the Czech 
Republic focus more on recruiting and training its military personnel, Czech Republic 
officials were anxious to acquire advanced weaponry.  
The Czech Republic saw this stage of development as a time to maximize the 
financial benefits of its future purchases by instituting its own offset policy. Recognizing 
its leading role as one of the most advanced economies in Central Europe and its 
important status in the international market for defense items, the Czech Republic 
formalized an offsets policy in 2000. The policy aims to increase levels of foreign 
investment in the Czech Republic, especially in civil sectors of society such as high 
technology and science. In 1998, the drafters of the legislation indicated that they also 
view offsets as a way to acquire new technology, increase employment opportunities for 
Czech Republic citizens, enhance sustainable economic development, and effectively 
further “the econom ic interests of the C zech R epublic.”28 The Czech government was 
able to draw from the offset experiences of other European nations while formalizing its 
own rules for offsets. The Ministry of Industry and Trade consulted with government 
officials from European allies, such as Great Britain, France, Finland, and Denmark, and 
                                                 
28 Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade Order No. 26, on implementation of offset programs, 
December 1, 1998. 
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held several conferences on the utility of offsets for the Czech Republic with 
representatives from both private industry and the government.  
The decision to codify its policy on offsets coincided w ith the C zech R epublic‟s 
announcement of its plan to devote $2 billion for the purchase of new fighter aircraft to  
replace its fleet of Russian MiGs. Because Czech officials view the technical parameters 
of the fighter jets being offered as so similar, offset packages outweighed technical 
factors and price when making a final decision. 
Realizing this new opportunity for sales, the Czech Republic has been inundated 
with offers from major international contractors. The companies trying to conclude deals 
with the Czech government included Boeing with its F/A-18, Lockheed Martin with its F-
16, British Aerospace-Saab with the JAS-39 Gripen and Dassault Aviation with its 
Mirage 2005. In addition to presenting their product, each firm constructed offset 
packages (each at least 100 percent) and started to create a niche for itself in the Czech 
economy.  
Boeing bought 34 percent of Aero Vodochody, a Czech firm, as a pre-offset and 
won a contract to supply Boeing 737 to Czech Airlines. It was valued at $33 million and 
resulted in a deal between Boeing and C zech A irlines. B oeing‟s subsidiary, A yers, also 
bought LET Kunovice, a major producer of commuter planes. Ayers plans to move part 
of the production line for its own planes to L E T . L ockheed M artin‟s pre-offset activities 
included a technology transfer program with Skoda Elcar, a Czech manufacturer of 
transportation equipment. Saab and British Aerospace have also started to make pre-





   
                                                 
29 Countertrade & Offset, Vol. XVII, No. 10, May 24, 1999. 
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A. THE CZECH ENVIRONMENT 
1. Overview 
The Czech Republic is commonly considered to be a political and economic 
success story among the former communist nations. It has a stable currency, low 
unemployment (7.3% in June 2006),30 low national debt (CZK 728.9 billion in July 
2006),31 and large foreign currency reserves (USD 30.197 billion in July 2006).32 Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 7.4 percent in the first quarter of 2006,33 and is 
estimated to stay in the range of six to seven percent in 2006 and 2007. The inflation rate 
in July 2006 was 2.4%.34  
The Czech Republic became the first former Warsaw Pact member to join the 
O E C D  in 1995, the first to be given an A  rating by S tandard and P oor‟s. Czechs were 
am ong the founding fathers of the U .N ., IM F , W orld B ank and G A T T  but the “iron 
curtain” did not allow  the country to be present at the birth of NATO. However, in 1999 
the Czech Republic finally became a NATO member. In 2004, the Czech Republic 
became a member of the EU as well. The country also offers an excellent central 
European location and a highly skilled work force. The country‟s overall 
macroeconomic, political, and social stability create an attractive investment climate for 
foreign investment and trade.  
 
                                                 
30 E urostat, “E uro A rea U nem ploym ent D ow n to 7.8% ,” 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_PRD_CAT_PREREL/PGE_CAT_PREREL_Y
EAR_2006/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2006_MONTH_08/3-01082006-EN-AP.PDF (accessed August 
1, 2006). 
31 M inistry of F inance of the C zech R epublic, “D ebt P ortfolio M anagem ent Q uarterly R eview ,” 
http://www.mfcr.cz/cps/rde/xbcr/mfcr/quarterly_review_062006_pdf.pdf (accessed June 30, 2006).  
32 C zech N ational B ank, “D ata T em plate on International R eserves and F oreign C urrency,” 
http://www.cnb.cz/en/statistics/bop_stat/international_reserves/drs_struktura_en.htm (accessed July 31, 
2006). 
33 E urostat, “E uro A rea and E U 25 G D P  up by 0.9% ,” 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_PRD_CAT_PREREL/PGE_CAT_PREREL_Y
EAR_2006/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2006_MONTH_08/2-14082006-EN-AP1.PDF (accessed August 
14, 2006). 
34 E urostat, “E uro A rea A nnual Inflation D ow n to 2.4% ,” 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_PRD_CAT_PREREL/PGE_CAT_PREREL_Y
EAR_2006/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2006_MONTH_08/2-17082006-EN-BP.PDF (accessed August 
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2. Defense Industry 
The Czech MoD's budget in 1993 was CZK 23.777 billion (1993 currency), 
representing 2.61% of G D P , or 6.7%  share of M oD ‟s expenditure in term s of overall 
expenditure of the S tate B udget.  H ow ever, the year 2006 M oD ‟s budget is C Z K  55.694 
billion (2006 currency), w hich is only 1.8%  of G D P , and 5.8%  M oD ‟s share in term s of 
overall expenditure of the State Budget of the Czech Republic (49% personnel 
expenditure, 12% equipment expenditure, 10% infrastructure expenditure, and 29% of 
other expenditure).35 The decrease in the percentage of GDP allocated for defense is 
significant. 
Similar to defense industries throughout the world, the Czech industry found that 
it must diversify and seek dual-use technologies to expand its market potential. The 
Czech Republic has a long industrial history of producing high quality aircraft and heavy 
equipment, as well as sophisticated technologies for radars. The Czech Republic's 
massive privatization program included restructuring and consolidating firms. The 
descendants of the former state owned defense sector include two primary consortia, or 
holding companies: Aero Holding, and Omnipol. 
Aero Holding manages several independent companies within the aviation sector; 
however, 99.96% of Aero is state-owned through the Czech Consolidation Agency.36 The 
Czech aviation industry is regulated by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. 
Omnipol deals with the purchase of goods for the purpose of further sale; trading 
brokerage; economic and management consulting; development, manufacturing, repairs, 
modification, transport, purchase, sale, lease, storage, degradation and destruction of 
weapons and ammunition; destruction, degradation, purchase and sale of explosives.37  
                                                                                                                                                 
17, 2006). 
35 M inistry of D efense, “B asic D ata of the S tate B udget in C hapter of the M inistry of D efense in 1993 -
2005,” http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=5760 (accessed July 16, 2006).  
36 A ero V odochody, “C om pany S tructure,” http://www.aero.cz/main.php?pageid=21 (accessed August 
20, 2006). 
37 O m nipol, “C om pany P rofile,” http://www.omnipol.cz/index.html (accessed August 20, 2006). 
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Companies trading in the defense industry are required to have licenses. 
Responsibility for issuing licenses is explained by the author of this thesis in Chapter IV.  
Nowadays, most Czech commercial companies have English-speaking staff 
members, and the same is true at the MoD. The number of sufficient and experienced 
personnel with foreign experiences is growing significantly. 
B. CZECH REPUBLIC POLICY AND EXPERIENCE 
In this chapter, the author will present first the principles of industrial 
cooperation, as it is outlined by the Czech government decree, and then will discuss the 
first year of the Industrial Cooperation Program, which is related to the lease of the 
supersonic aircraft JAS Gripen. 
1. Regulations of Offset Programs 
Offset policy has been implemented into the procurement programs in the Czech 
Republic since the year 1998. That year, the government issued its first decree that stated 
conditions for application of offsets requirements.38 Experience soon demonstrated that 
the decree needed revision. Especially, works on the supersonic aircraft procurement 
contract required a considerable amount of flexibility in reaching the agreement from 
both the procurement staff and the contractor. 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade therefore, used that experience to prepare a 
new decree, which was approved by the government in 2005.39  Following the decree, the 
Minister of Industry and Trade issued his order that detailed the governmental decree.40 
In short, the implementation of offsets, or Industrial Cooperation Programs, has 
never been regulated by a special law in the Czech Republic. It is regulated by the 
government decree and is binding on all government organizations and bodies 
                                                 
38 The Government of the Czech Republic Decree No. 421, June 17, 1998, on Realization of Offset 
programs. 
39 The Government of the Czech Republic Decree No. 9, January 5, 2005, on Industry Cooperation 
Programs Realization. 
40 Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic Order No. 3, February 2, 2005, on Industry 
Cooperation Programs Realization. 
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performing procurement with state budget funds. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of 
the Czech Republic is the keeper of the industrial cooperation policy. 
2. Offset Programs Objective  
To understand reasons for adopting the industrial cooperation policy, it is 
necessary to look at the recent history of the Czech Republic. Not even two decades ago 
the former Czechoslovakia, of which the Czech Republic was an integral part, belonged 
to industrially developed countries. During the last fifteen years the Czech Republic 
sustained complete political and economical changes. Large heavy industrial companies 
disappeared and mostly small and medium-sized enterprises took their place. 
Transformation of the economy also caused a turn away from the traditional markets. 
That meant also the loss of traditional customers. This situation was particularly 
significant in the defense industry. Radical changes in the economy resulted also in a 
radical change in the wealth of citizens. Different regions were developing unevenly. 
There are traditionally industrial regions of the Czech Republic where the unemployment 
rate grew up dramatically to 20 %. Therefore, all Government purchases from foreign 
suppliers are politically a very sensitive issue. 
In the above-mentioned decree, the government formulated objectives of the 
Industrial Cooperation Programs that complement the overall governmental policy of 
employment, regional development and industrial development.  
Compensation for the loss of manufacturing opportunities and jobs incurred by 
the Czech economy, owing to the fact that a contract for purchasing of equipment, 
materials and services for defense and security purposes was awarded by an open public 
tender to a foreign subject, is therefore considered one of the key objectives of industrial 
cooperation. All other objectives support other governmental policies, like increase in the 
competitiveness of the domestic industry together with the export capabilities, transfer of 
know-how and progressive technologies, stimulation of foreign investments and support 
of the establishment of joint ventures and long-term relationships. All these objectives 
support employment and regional development. 
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The author believes it is fair to say that the Czech government uses other means 
as well to stimulate foreign investment, like the so-called tax vacancy, financial support 
to the newly opened company, etc. It goes without saying that the Czech Republic is not 
the only government using such economic tools. 
3. Principles of Offset Programs  
There are four main principles for offset transactions in the Czech Republic:41  
 To apply compensation transactions to direct deliveries exceeding CZK 
500 million (+/- EUR 16.6 million), or sub deliveries exceeding CZK 250 
million (+/- EUR 8.3 million) of equipment, materials and services for 
defense and security purposes from abroad 
 The compensation to constitute at least 100% of contract value with at 
least 20% in direct offsets 
 Offsets have to be implemented within 10 years of contract date 
 Condition for participation in a public tender 
Specific preference for direct offsets is one of the main features of the Industrial 
Cooperation Programs. The direct offsets are those transactions, directly related to the 
subject of the public contract, to which the offset obligation is related. Direct Offset 
Transactions shall account for at least 20 percent of the purchase price of the subject 
matter of the public contract in question, which is charged by the foreign contractor or 
subcontractor. 
The author emphasizes here that the requirement for the implementation of an 
offset program in the framework of a public contract is generally formulated as an 
indispensable condition for taking part in a public tender or, if just one contractor is 
addressed, an indispensable condition of the performance of the public contract. 
Officially, the Czech Republic does not use offsets as a selection criteria for 
selecting a winner in the public tender. That means that no specific companies have 
                                                 
41 Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic Order No. 3, February 2, 2005, on Industry 
Cooperation Programs Realization. 
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advantage. Nor are coefficients used to show a preference to the specific type of 
transactions. Therefore it is safe to say that the Czech Republic does not use offsets to 
give advantage to some companies over the remaining ones.  
4. Relationships in the Process of Industrial Cooperation Programs 
The relationship of the Governmental bodies and the supplier in the process of 
ICP is introduced in Figure 1. There are several key players in the ICP. At the stage of 
contract negotiation, the key players are the Ministry of Defense on one side and the 
winner of the competition on the other. These two players therefore maintain the legal 
relationship as long as the offset agreement is in effect; this means they sign the 
agreement on the ICP. The MoD represents the Czech Republic and has the final word on 
approval of the final value of particular offset transactions. 
Another key relationship is between the contractor and the Czech industry. 
Professional associations, such as the Defense Industry Association (DIA), can represent 
the industry. The government neither declares where the offsets should be directed nor 
selects the Czech partner of the offset transaction. It is a responsibility of the Contractor 
to research capabilities of the Czech industry and to find the suitable partner. Once the 
contractor and the selected Czech partner come to an agreement, they together develop 
the offset transaction proposal and the contractor submits the proposal to the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade. The MIT presents the proposal to the Offset Commission.   
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Figure 1.   Relationship in the Process of Industrial Cooperation Programs42 
 
a. Specific Role of the Offset Commission 
This Offset Commission is an intergovernmental body, whose members 
have the delegated authority to approve the submitted transaction. The Commission itself 
consists of representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry for Regional Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministries of 
Defense and Interior as representatives of the state in the offset agreement. The Ministry 
of Industry and Trade provides the chairman of the Commission and administrative 
support. The administrative support functions are to take minutes, to prepare the decision 
on the presented transactions and to keep a record of each of the ICP. The MIT therefore 
is the only body that has a total overview on all programs and all transactions. By 
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preparing the C om m ission‟s decision, it prevents the contractors from  registering the 
same offset transaction to more than one ICP. The Commission meets regularly, at least 
four times a year. During the meeting, The Ministry of Industry and Trade, after the 
decision is taken, registers the approved transaction to the specific program. 
b. Actual Value of the Offset Transaction 
Once the Offset Commission approves the transaction and MIT registers it 
against the particular program, the contractor, foreign commercial partner and the Czech 
partner work together on meeting the offset transaction objectives. To be able to prove 
the actual value of the transaction, the Czech partner has to establish a separate branch in 
its accounting records. The contractor submits an annual report to the MoD. The MoD 
forwards the report to the MIT and to the Offset Commission for comments. Final 
decision on the actual value of the offset transaction and the whole ICP, however, is 
issued by the MoD. The decision is based on the comments of the Offset Committee and 
on the audit results on the transactions. MoD representatives and/or the private subject 
with the delegated authority from the MoD reviews the book keeping records of the 
Czech partner, related to the offset transaction. The contractor therefore is required to 
forward a list of invoices, and relevant parts of the records of the Czech partner that are 
related to the transaction, as an attachment of the annual report to the MoD. When the 
ICP obligations are met, the MoD and the MIT inform the government. 
c. Specific Requirements 
In the effort of foreign commercial partners to look for transaction 
opportunities, the Czech side does not set up any specific requirement (industrial, branch 
or regional) for the individual offset programs nor transactions. The MoD and the 
contractor set the legal relationship. The contractor looks for the business opportunities 
either for himself or for another foreign partner. The foreign partner and the Czech 
partner establish the commercial relationship. The MIT provides the keeping of the ICP 
record. The Offset Commission approves the transactions and provides the statement to 
the Annual report. The MOD approves the actual value of transactions performed over 
the monitored year, and through that the overall performance of the Industrial 
Cooperation Program Agreement. 
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5. Agreement on the Industrial Cooperation Program 
The ICP is a relationship agreed on for a maximum of 10 years. Conditions of the 
relationship are, as the author mentioned before, listed in the Industrial Cooperation 
Agreement. The MIT directive set out the important issues that should be covered 
specifically by the agreement. Those are the subject matter of the deal, scope and 
structure of the program, rules to be used to measure the program value, timetable of the 
program, method of monitoring the program and rules governing any changes of and 
amendments to the program, sanctions for non-performance, and provisions concerning 
proprietary and confidential information. 
The carefully formulated agreement is the key to the good relationship between 
the MoD and the contractor. Specific areas for negotiation are especially those dealing 
with the performance timetable, connected with the milestones and related penalizations. 
Also, procedures and required documents for approval of the final value of the 
transaction and the whole program are must. 
The Industrial Cooperation Agreement should be signed at the same time as the 
related delivery contract. 
6. Offset Transactions 
Besides the obvious categories of the offset transactions, which are the direct and 
indirect offsets, the offset transactions are recognized by their type, as follows: 
 Transfer of Technologies and Know-how, Support of R&D 
 Direct Foreign Investment 
 Export Promotion 
 Others 
The transfer of technologies are represented by Offset Transactions intensifying 
the transfer of technologies and know-how for the benefit of the Czech Republic, 
promoting participation of Czech entities in the international research and development 
programs, strengthening Czech scientific and research capabilities and last, but not least, 
improving skills and knowledge of human resources.  
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Direct investments are represented by direct investment activities of a foreign 
partner in the Czech Republic. 
Export promotion is represented by arranging and mediating new export contracts 
for domestic entities. It may be, for example, introducing a Czech product, which has not 
yet been exported, to foreign markets, acquiring new foreign customers for products that 
have already been exported, or a significant increase in existing export levels. 
Others are represented by Offset Transactions that have been discussed and 
accepted by the Offset Commission and in respect whereof an agreement has been 
achieved between the party submitting the proposal and the Offset Commission. 
7. Value of the Transaction – Measuring Mechanisms 
The author expresses the importance of the fact that the value of the offset 
transaction is actually looked at retrospectively. It means that the value is calculated from 
the account records of the Czech partner of the transaction. 
Considering the four types of transactions that were shown on the previous page, 
an assumption can be made that there are three methods on how to calculate the actual 
value of the transaction. 
a. “A ” M ech an ism  
F irst, the “A ” M echanism  serves for m easuring the value of the D irect 
Foreign Investment Type of the transaction. 
Formula: Z=X-Y 
Where: Y= (P+Q+R) 
Z - The actual value of the transaction for the monitored calendar year, 
X - The income from the sale of the products and services, 
Y - Value calculated by adding all occurred costs of the Czech partner for 
procurement of materiel (P), occurred costs of the Czech partner for services, related to 
the transaction (Q) and costs for energies related to the offset transaction (R). This 
mechanism is used to measure the Direct Foreign Investments type of transactions. 
 35 
In case the Czech partner runs other business, ”X “, ”P “, ”Q “ and ”R “ 
values will be related to the offset transaction. 
When the Czech company agrees on being a partner of the transaction, it 
has to set up a separate branch in its accounting records. 
b. “B ” M ech an ism  
S econd, the “B ” M echanism is used for measuring a value of the support 
to export type of transactions. 
Formula: N=L-M 
Where: L - Summary of all export revenues of the Czech partner 
that are related to the transaction, 
M - Summary of all purchases from abroad of the Czech 
partner related to the transaction. For declaring the origin of the goods the 
appropriate certificate is used, and 
N –  Value of the transaction. 
c. Other Types of Transaction  
Remaining types of transaction are measured according to the agreed way. 
The agreement must be done between the foreign partner and the Offset Commission. 
The Offset Commission will always approve the type of the transaction, including the 
proposed value and the mechanism for measuring. The MoD, following the decision of 
the Offset Commission, uses the appropriate mechanism for approving the reached value 
of the transaction.43 
C. THE GRIPEN PROGRAM IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
Gripen Program is the biggest example of Czech Republic MoD activity under the 
ICPs. The author believes this program represents one of the positive examples of the 
offset policy implementation in the Czech Republic. For an overall picture and better 
                                                 
43 MIT, Provision No. 3/2005, on realization of  the programs for industrial cooperation (accessed 
September 19, 2006). 
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understanding the author provides the following development steps of the Supersonic 
Aircraft Project: 
 1993 - MiG-29 supersonic fighters were decommissioned from the inventory of 
the Czech Armed Forces. 
 1995 - The Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic Parliament resolved that 
plans to modernize the MiG-21 aircraft were ineffective. 
 1997 - The Government decided in favor of supersonic aircraft acquisition and 
endorsed the procurement of 72 L-159 subsonic aircraft. 
 1999 - Concept on the Development of the MoD Department, including 
procurement of supersonic aircraft, was approved by the Government. In the same year, 
MiG-23 and Su-25 aircraft were decommissioned from the inventory of the Czech Armed 
Forces. 
 2000 - Public bidding process began in order to select a supersonic aircraft 
supplier. 
 2001 - Report on bids evaluation was submitted. The Government decided to 
initiate contractual negotiation with BAE/SAAB. Furthermore, the L-159 aircraft were 
introduced. 
 2002 - Draft agreement on the procurement of 24 Gripen tactical supersonic 
aircraft was submitted, and approved by the Government. With that, the Chamber of 
Deputies of the Parliam ent of the C zech R epublic rejected the draft bill on the aircraft‟s 
procurement financing. 
 July 9, 2003 - The Government of the Czech Republic Decree No. 686 endorsed 
the draft provision for completing the Concept on the Development of the Czech Air 
Force and the Czech Armed Forces in the area of airspace protection by means of a 
supersonic aircraft. MoD was commissioned to: 1. Send a request for submitting a 
Feasibility Study to the Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, French Republic, 
Canada, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Republic of Turkey, United States of America, 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Sweden; 2. Assess the Feasibility 
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Studies received, including that of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, develop a proposal on further procedures and submit these 
to the government for decision. 
 July 25, 2003 - Multilateral working session was held where the tender 
specifications and further requirements by the MoD were conveyed to the bidders. 
 September 11, 2003 - Expert workshop attended by representatives of addressed 
countries was held AFB Caslav to specify the terms of the procurement process. The 
workshop was not attended by UK representatives. The British party, having analyzed the 
requirements that were submitted to all addressed countries on July 25, 2003, decided not 
to continue in the process of searching for an interim solution to securing the Czech 
R epublic‟s airspace. T he aim  of this m eeting w as to specify technical, financial and tim e 
aspects concerning the bids processing. The workshop participants were apprised of the 
operational conditions and parameters of the airbase where the aircraft are planned to be 
operated in future. 
 October 20, 2003 - The Government of the Czech Republic Decree No. 1051 
determined that the aircraft procurement is a strategic order. 
 October 31, 2003 - The three-month period for development of feasibility studies 
w as term inated and the bidders‟ proposals w ere subm itted. S even countries presented 
their bids - Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden and the USA. 
Turkey withdrew on October 15, 2003. Bids Review and Evaluation Commission was 
appointed based on the Decree No. 1050, dated October 20, 2003. This nine-member 
joint commission included representatives of the MoD, MFA, MIT, and MF. 
 November 30, 2003 - The interdepartmental commission completed the 
Feasibility Studies assessment, and based on the set criteria established a bids order that 
was then presented to all government members by the Minister of Defense. The 
Commission recommended that the bid submitted by the Kingdom of Sweden on the 
JAS-39 Gripen complex system be accepted as the most favorable. The bid on F-16 MLU 
aircraft by the Kingdom of Belgium placed second, while bids submitted by Canada, the 
Netherlands and the USA followed. 
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 December 17, 2003 - The Government of the Czech Republic decided the 
Swedish bid was the best one for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, and 
commissioned MoD, MF, MIT, and MFA to negotiate procurement of fourteen aircraft 
exclusively with the Kingdom of Sweden. The negotiations were initiated. 
 May 28, 2004 –  The documentation on the prepared supersonic aircraft lease was 
presented to the Government. 
 June 2, 2004 - The Government held deliberations on a draft Memorandum of 
Understanding, Lease Agreement and Industrial Co-operation Agreement. 
 June 9, 2004 - The Government of the Czech Republic based on successful 
negotiation between the Czech and Swedish parties, decided by the Government Decree 
No. 596 on the lease of Gripen aircraft, and entrusted the Ministry of Defense with 
finalizing negotiations with the Swedish party and signing contractual obligations.  
 June 14, 2004 –  Agreements between the Czech Republic and the Kingdom of 
Sweden concerning the lease of JAS-39 Gripen aircraft for the needs of the Czech Armed 
Forces were signed at the Ministry of Defense. 
 2005 - Service life of the MiG-21 supersonic aircraft was over.44 
1. Primary Facts about the Gripen Program 
The Agreement on the Industrial cooperation program has been signed45 for a 
period from June 14, 2004 through December 31, 2014. This period represents more than 
10 years. The offset obligation represents 130% of the Gripen aircraft lease, of which 
20% represents the direct offsets. Speaking in absolute figures, the offset obligation is 
CZK 25.5 billion.46    
                                                 
44 Peter Fuzak, e-mail message to the author, June 2, 2006. 
45 On Monday, June 14, 2004, a set of agreements were entered into and signed at the Czech Ministry 
of Defense by the Czech Republic and the Kingdom of Sweden on the lease of JAS-39 Gripen supersonic 
fighter aircraft to be operated by the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, 
http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=3567 (accessed June 24, 2006). 
46 Petr Hakl, telephone interview with the author, July 31, 2006. 
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The Industrial Cooperation Program was approved, as was the main delivery 
contract, by the Czech government.47 
a. Gripen Program Performance Agreement - Projected 
The projected performance over the years in terms of value and percentage 
of the Industrial Cooperation is introduced in Figure 2.  
BAE Systems actually started fulfillment of the program in the year 2002, 
when the public bidding started for the first time. However, it was stopped and started 
again in 2003. After selection of a bidder, it took almost 4 months to develop an 
industrial cooperation agreement. As the author mentioned previously, under the 
conditions of the former governmental decree, the agreement required a lot of effort and 
flexibility from both sides to develop a comprehensive agreement with sound and 
satisfactory conditions for both sides. The final agreement between both sides is that the 
new governmental decree applies in full strength to the Industrial Cooperation 
Agreement. 
As shown below, BAE Systems agreed to implement the Industrial 
Cooperation Program of the total cumulative value CZK 25.5 billion. The performance is 
carefully estimated with milestones at the years of 2006 and 2009, with the final 
“m ilestone” at the end of the program. Milestones are the time points in the program 
when the performance is judged very carefully. At those points the performance must 







                                                 
47 The Government of the Czech Republic Decree No. 596/2004 













Figure 2.   Gripen Program Projected Performance Agreement (current year money)48 
  
By the end of the year 2006, the volume of the ICP should reach CZK 
5.09 billion. This represents 20% of the total value of the program. By the end of 2009, 
the overall value of performed transactions shall reach slightly more than CZK 12 billion, 
with CZK 2.44 billion of that amount in the direct offset area. Those amounts represent 
48% and 9.6% respectively. Should the BAE System perform below these agreed values, 
the penalty will be applied by the MOD. Generally, the penalty will represent a 
percentage of the difference between the actual performance and the planned value. The 
penalty bears a feature of the performance bond; it means that once the BAE System 
reaches the planned performance -- the projected curve again -- the money would be 
released back by the MoD. Should the BAE Systems remain in delay with the program 
performance, the penalty will be used as a part of the final penalization.  
                                                 
48 LTC Petr Hakl, e-mail message to the author, May 11, 2006. 























In the time between the milestones, the performance may drop below the 
projected curve without problems. The drop will be noted and the performance will be 
closely observed in the upcoming years. 
This chart, as well as the related table, is incorporated into the Industrial 
Cooperation Program Agreement. 
b. Actual Gripen Program Performance 
Actual performance is depicted in Figure 3. As shown, BAE System had 
an excellent start in the program and instead of the value of CZK 2.79 billion actually 
generated CZK 4.21 billion. Some of these values have been generated by the pre-offset 
transactions. Nevertheless, as the author mentioned previously, it had taken two years 
before the program was approved and the contract signed. Speaking in percents, the 
required generated value was 11 percent. The approved value generated by the end of 
2004 was 16.5 percent. 
Unfortunately, the actual publicly releasable data is for the first year of the 
Gripen Program only. The annual report for the year 2005 is being finalized by the BAE 
systems as the author of this thesis conducts research. The actual value and the 
cumulative value of the program for the year 2005 and for the whole period of the 
program shall be approved by the MoD. 
For easier research of capabilities of the Czech industry, looking for the 
transaction opportunities and also in order to liaise with the MoD, BAE SYSTEMS 
provides the Czech offset delivery team and is contractually responsible to Gripen 
International for the timely delivery of the offset requirement. This practice proved to be 
successful. T he B A E  em ployees are able to conduct research “on the ground” , identify 
opportunities in terms of subject and possible value of the transaction and send the data to 
the center. The data is evaluated there and a possible partner is being sought. If the 
partner agrees, the offset delivery team will organize preparation of the transaction from 
the point of administrative requirement. Up to now, the concept works fine. There are 
five new offset transactions submitted to the Ministry of Industry and Trade and awaiting 












Figure 3.   Actual Gripen Program Performance (current year money)49 
 
Figure 4 gives an impression of how the ICP is being filled by single 
transactions.  
The geographical spread of transactions shows how the offset delivery 
team did cope with this issue. The offset delivery team obviously tried to spread all 
transactions evenly, so they would not face any future complaints. However, the author 
believes that this is not supposed to be the main issue. Once the Government agrees with 
the Industrial Cooperation, the areas with huge unemployment rate and with the need of 
investment should be considered. All principles of offset as well as principles of free 





                                                 

































Figure 4.   Distribution of Offset Transactions 
 
c. Transactions Distribution 
The approximate distribution of running transactions for the Gripen 
Program by the type of industry is as follow: 
 Direct Offsets 
- Aerospace CZK 10.3 million 
- Ammunition Components CZK 68.5 million 
- Naval Material CZK 108.5 million 
 Indirect Offsets 
- Heavy Industry CZK 1847.5 million 
- Automotive Industry CZK 674.8 million 
- Electronics/Electrical CZK 1504.2 million 
To clarify, the Government agreed to extend the understanding of direct 
offsets to the transactions placed with the whole defense industry of the Czech Republic 
for purposes of the Gripen program. The offsets were placed with the traditionally strong 
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areas of the Czech economy, except for the transactions directed to the area of 
electronics. The government has obviously preferred regions of the Czech Republic, or 
areas of the industry. The preferred regions are those with higher unemployment rates. 
The areas of industry are those where the technological progress can be the highest and 
where the Czech Republic feels her industrial capabilities are lagging. 
The Czech Republic understands offsets as generating new economic 
benefit for the Czech Republic by means of income produced by foreign investments, by 
means of new export, and contracts of transfer of technology. The government does not 
use offsets (with rare exception) as a means to provide advantage to the selected regions, 
nor areas of industry. The MoD, as a contractual partner, has final authority to endorse 
the actually produced value of each offset transaction and the overall performance of the 
program. 
The key to the successful, and for both sides beneficial, relationship is the 
comprehensive agreement on the ICP. The Gripen program is a good proof of the quality 
of the new government policy and a positive example of the industrial cooperation 
execution.   
Although most of these offset transactions will generate a value in the 
future, the Czech MoD approved the second annual Offset Performance Report, which 
claims that about two years into the ten year program, the total offset reached CZK 6.6 
billion (26% of the total obligation).50 Nevertheless, about 3/4 of the overall value of the 
program has yet to be generated. Up to now, it seems that the program will be going well 
in the near future. The latest claim also forwarded new transaction proposals to the MIT. 
D.     THE F-16 PROGRAM IN POLAND 
T o provide som e com parison w ith another country‟s experience, the author 
introduces the F-16 program carried out in Poland. 
                                                 
50 G ripen International, “S econd G ripen O ffset C laim  A pproved in C zech R epublic,” 
http://www.gripen.hu/pressreleases/060524/secondgripenoffsetclaimapprovedinczechrepublic.4.10948cf10
b64c88e22800022.html (accessed July 20, 2006). 
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Poland faced similar problems with modernizing its military, according to NATO 
standards, as the Czech Republic. Replacing the aging Soviet-made MIG fighters was a 
huge challenge for Poland, and offset offers were expected to be an important part of 
foreign suppliers‟ proposals.  
In D ecem ber 2002, P oland announced L ockheed M artin‟s F -16 C/D Block 52 
model powered by F-100-299 engines from the United Technologies unit of Pratt & 
Whitney, the winner of a three-way tender to support 48 combat jets. Along with the F-
16, the F rench D assault A viation‟s M irage 2000 -5 Mk2 and the Swedish Jas-39 Gripen 
participated in the contest. L ockheed‟s proposal included over 100 offset projects valued 
at USD 9.8 billion (According to Polish officials it was a value of USD only 6 billion). 
Dassault, in comparison, proposed projects valued at USD 7.8 billion and Gripen USD 
3.9 billion. Military experts rated the F-16 and Mirage about the same as fighting aircraft, 
with the cheaper Gripen third. Since the Lockheed offset proposals outweighed the 
others, Poland decided to go ahead with the F-16.51 
The author wants to emphasize also the fact that Lockheed Martin was backed by  
a U.S. Government loan of USD 3.8 billion which foresaw interest payment only through 
2010.    
On April 18, 2003 four significant agreements were signed by the Polish 
Government, the U.S. Armed Forces, and Lockheed Martin. The documents are as 
follows: 
 The USD 3.5 billion contract for the delivery of forty eight F-16 aircraft to 
the Polish Air Force in 2006 –  2008 
 The Financial Agreement accommodating the contract 
 T he A greem ent for the U .S . G overnm ent‟s soft loan to the Polish 
Government financing the purchase 
                                                 
51 “P oland picks L ockheed F -16 in $3.5B  deal,” F -16.net, http://www.f-16.net/news_article698.html 
(accessed July 18, 2006). 
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 Finally, the biggest offset agreement between Poland and foreign suppliers 
–  the M aster O ffset A greem ent, called the “C ontract of the C entury” -- 
was signed by the Polish Minister of Economy, Labor and Social Policy 
and the Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company. 
According to the Press and Information Office of the Polish Ministry of 
Economy, Labor, and Social Policy the nominal value (without multiplier) of the 
L ockheed M artin‟s offset com m itm ents is U S D  7.751 billion.52  The agreement contains 
44 offset programs out of which 16 are direct investment into the defense industry and 28 
are indirect investments. 
The offset obligation, in the case of the Czech Gripen Program, represents 130% 
of the Gripen aircraft lease, of which 20% represents the direct offsets. While in the case 
of the Polish F-16 aircraft purchase, the offset obligation represents more than 200%, of 
which 36% represents the direct offset. The Czech Minister of Defense has the final word 
in particular contract, and also signs an agreement. In Poland, the decision is made and an 
agreement signed by the Minister of Economy, Labor and Social Policy. The first 
aircrafts were assigned to the Czech Air Force in less than a year after the agreement was 
signed. In the case of Polish F-16, the first delivery was planned after three years from 
the agreement signature. Both the Czech Republic and Poland claim that offset 
commitments are not the most important in the process of selecting the winner of  







                                                 
52 P olish M inistry of E conom y, L abor, and S ocial P olicy, “T he C om parison of L ockheed M artin‟s 
O ffset C om m itm ents,” http://www.mgip.gov.pl/nr/rdonlyres/d388b4f0-f028-4d79-a15f- 
b5efd29bdc8f/0/zestawienie_zbiorcze.doc, (accessed August 13, 2006). 
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IV. ISSUES CONCERNING OFFSET IMPLEMENTATION IN 
THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Czech Republic does not have a long experience with offset practices. 
However, the Czech Government claims many benefits for defense trade offsets, 
although the total value of offset transactions will not be clear until the end of the 
particular offset program (The biggest offset transaction in the Czech Republic so far, the 
Gripen Program will end in 2015).   
Employment creation, technology transfers, and foreign exchange are among 
some of the benefits. The first policy on offset realization was approved by the 
Government in 1998, as the author introduced in Chapter III.  
The international defense market is complex, very often lacking in transparency, 
characterized by corruption, bribery, dishonest deals, and nepotism ( see Appendix A for 
more details). Defense offsets have been criticized in this light mainly by U.S. 
policymakers, but at the same time appreciated by others, such as the Czech Government. 
The author does not intend to answer the question why it is so, nor whether ambitions 
match with achievements. Rather, the author wants to emphasize some issues the Czech 
Republic should focus on in order to increase competitiveness in an international, as well 
as domestic, market.   
B. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY 
1. Imperfection of the Public Procurement Act 
a. Introduction 
Public procurement is one of the cornerstones of the European, as well as 
world, market, and is an important sector of the economy.  In the past years, the EU 
bodies, NGOs, and professional associations and chambers have criticized provisions of 
the Public Procurement Act (PPA).  The EU criticized both selected provisions of the 
PPA and the inefficiency of its enforcement. In recent years, the Act has been amended 
numerous times. The last amendment, intended to harmonize the Czech legislation with 
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the EU norm in this particular area, has been approved by both chambers of the 
Parliament and was signed by the President and came into force in full on May 1, 2004.53 
However, even this last amendment has met, as a result of its inadequate anti-corruption 
measures, with fierce criticism. This act is not fully approximated to the EU legislation. 
Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), such as Transparency International Czech 
Republic, and representatives of the business community have criticized the newly 
amended act for its failure to allow public access to information on the content of 
contracts and their appendices.  
b. Deficiency of the Public Procurement Act  
The author of this research believes that the adoption of the Act on Public 
Procurement still needs to be finalized, to ensure equal access for European Community 
companies through abolition of the national preference clause, alignment on remedies, 
improve transparency, alignment on time limits and thresholds. The Ministry of Regional 
Development has overall responsibility for public procurement legislation. The lack of 
qualified staff working at the ministry in this area should be urgently addressed. The 
Office for the Protection of Economic Competition should thoroughly exercise the 
surveillance of adherence to the Act on Public Procurement when awarding public 
contracts.  The level of administrative capacity seems sufficient. Staff in both 
organizations, as well as in other relevant institutions (ministries, regional bodies, etc.) 
will need re-training once the adoption of the new, aligned public procurement act is 
finalized. 
As it currently reads the amended Public Procurement Act (PPA) 
stipulates solely the minimum price of the future contract.  It limits the term public 
procurement to subcontractor, service, and construction contracts, as well as restricting 
the interim provisions guiding the private contractors to those contracts where the public 
stake amounts to a minimum of 50 per cent of the contract.  The Public Procurement Act 
allows for more exceptions from the law, and more exceptions from the force of the Act.  
Although PPA gives the government a free hand in selecting the type of the selection 
                                                 
53 Act No. 40/2004 Coll. on Public Procurement. 
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process –  fully open procurement process or an invitation for bid -- it further complicates 
the proposal for a review process by a supervisory body by introducing high 
administrative fees simultaneously with a non-returnable advance deposit. 
The PPA fails to introduce proper provisions guiding bid bonds by 
subcontractors and bidders whose bid process are not known; it fails to introduce a 
deadline for the ruling of a supervisory body on a preliminary measure or any other 
remedy to discontinue the challenged act of a contractor.  Besides the above-mentioned 
failures, it further fails to provide for a mechanism to review the evaluation of the bids by 
the selection commission by a supervisory body.  The PPA also introduces incorrect 
remedies and sanctions and its selected provisions may be impossible to apply and may 
make the PPA unenforceable. The author sees a negative impact of the amended Act on 
the prevention of corruption. An example would be the fact that the PPA excludes from 
its scope the sale of redundant military material from the warehouses of the Czech Armed 
Forces as well as arms acquisitions for the use of the military. The previous PPA54 
excluded from its scope the sale of redundant military material as well as procurement of 
“strategic property and services approved by the G overnm ent of the C zech R epublic and 
related to the accession and m em bership of the C R  in N A T O .”  
 However, in §4, the new PPA No. 40/2004 further limits its effectiveness 
by excluding from its scope contracts “should they concern secret facts or m atters”, 
“should it be necessary in order to protect fundam ental national security interests”, or 
“should such contracts concern production, procurem ent, or m aintenance of arm s, 
weapon systems, ammunition, or supply of other military material to defend or protect 
national security”.55 Under this new PPA, such contracts do not require government 
approval and do not fall under the supervision of the anti-monopoly authority, the Office 
for Protection of Economic Competition (OPEC). The older version of the PPA had 
withdrawn OPEC from supervising the sale of excess weaponry from the military 
warehouses and the new one now stipulates that the anti-monopoly office shall not 
supervise procurement of weapons for the military either. Public spending in acquisition 
                                                 
54 Public Procurement Act No. 199/1994 Coll. 
55 See reference No. 30. 
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and sale of weapons is thus excluded from already limited public control, and the same is 
true for supervision by more or less independent subjects. The legislators, however, not 
only failed to justify the exclusion but also forgot to replace the abolished supervision 
mechanisms by substitute control provisions. Therefore, they negated one of the most 
important principles in the arms trading. 
c. Secretiveness of Agreements 
Although the MoD has introduced some positive changes to its public 
procurement practice, especially in the area of internal control mechanisms,56 such 
measures fail to replace independent control over the matter.  In the case of large public 
contracts to acquire armament for the Czech military, the authorities, in keeping with the 
PPA have often used provisions that allow for limiting the procurement process to an 
invitation for bid to a group of pre-selected bidders or solely to a single bidder. Such a 
process, combined with the widely used provision of the Commercial Code, which guides 
events of business secret57 and “protection under the A ct on P rotection of S ecret F acts”,58 
have understandably led to suspicions of corruption and non-transparency of the public 
procurement process. 
2. Intricacy of Contracts and Offsets 
a. Offsets Importance for the Government 
Intricacy of contracts and their appendices concerning offsets is another 
issue in arms trade, and is one of the risk factors.  The offsets allow government 
representatives to justify contracts given out to bidders whose quality and price are far 
from perfect by saying that their offsets will bring investments in a form of side or 
additional investment programs. In some cases, such investments may be in the hands of 
business entities in which the decision makers hold substantial stakes. Moreover, 
enforcement of the provisions regarding offsets is often disputable.  Regardless of the 
                                                 
56 Partially structuring the public procurement process and introducing internal MoD control 
mechanisms, and providing wider access to information regarding both planned and implemented public 
contracts on the web pages of the MoD. For more information see www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=170 
(accessed July 22, 2006).  
57 §17, Act No. 513/1991 Coll., Commercial Code, as amended. 
58 §3, Act No. 148/1998 Coll., on Protection of Secret Facts. 
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risks, the Czech Government, in its decisions regarding the largest strategic public 
procurements, viewed offsets as an important part of the bids.59   
b. Unclear Evaluation Criteria 
Unclear evaluation criteria that may even change in the course of the 
procurement process are among other risks.  Such criteria may be used to influence the 
key decision makers and to cover up for potential corrupt behavior. The evaluation 
criteria were not transparent, and suspicions of changes in the course of the procurement 
process have been present in the selection process for the supersonic aircraft for the 
Czech military (worth CZK 19.65 billion) and threaten to influence the upcoming 
contract for wheeled transporters (worth CZK 20.8 billion).60 
c. Unclear Czech National Armament Strategy and the Consequent 
Changes  
The first National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Czech Republic was 
adopted by the Czech government in 1999,61 before the Czech Republic joined NATO. It 
was the key strategic document of the national security policy and as such it has been 
revised several times since then. Since 1993,62 the government annually revises the Czech 
Military Development Concept.  
Regardless of the two documents, the Czech armed forces in the past few 
years have witnessed substantial changes in decision-making concerning the Czech 
armed forces concept, scope, goals, and armament requirements.  A number of decisions 
were made concerning expensive armament acquisitions, only to be cancelled several 
years later, resulting in billions in wasted funds.  There have been no political or criminal 
sanctions for wrongly invested public funds.  The lack of a clearly defined concept or the 
frequent changes thereof, as well as the failure to assign responsibility for specific wrong 
                                                 
59 Not To Compare Would Be Better, Euro on December 22, 2003; Any Advice Is Beyond Price, Euro 
on December 1, 2003; Slowly It Flows But Fast It Burns, Euro on December 1, 2003. 
60 Ministry of Defense, “M inister of D efense S igned the C ontract on A rm ored T ransporters,” 
http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=7639 (accessed June 9, 2006). However the consensus 
throughout the Government was not reached, and the contract was signed in the time of parliamentary 
elections. 
61 Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. 123, February 17, 1999. 
62 Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. 297, June 9, 1993. 
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decisions, increases the risk of unlawful influence of commercial entities interested in the 
results of the decision making process over government officials. 
 
C. PUBLIC SUBSIDIES 
Public subsidies to industrial plants or corporations are common in the Czech 
Republic and all over the world, and due to their potential the author believes they are an 
issue for the defense trade.  Publicly, of course, the Czech government talk about the 
need to maintain jobs and the defense industrial base. These corporations are among the 
largest in the Czech Republic, as well as in the world, and they have tremendous political 
influence.   
Public subsidies in the Czech Republic are guided by the Act on Public 
Subsidies,63 and supervised by the Office for Protection of Economic Competition 
(O P E C ).  T his research considers public subsidies in the C zech R epublic‟s defense trade 
as relatively high, non-transparent, and very often kept secret. 
1. Unnecessary Contract Awards  
Awarding of unnecessary defense contracts has been an issue for a long time.  For 
illustration, the author presents some of them.  In 1997, the Czech government approved 
the acquisition of 72 L-159 subsonic aircraft, in an attempt to avert the bankruptcy of 
Aero Vodochody at the time of the negotiations concerning the entry of Boeing into Aero 
as a new strategic partner.64 In 2003, however, the Ministry of Defense reported that the 
armed forces actually did not need 47 of the aircraft ordered.65 Aero Vodochody 
delivered the last L-159 in February 2004, and only four months later the Government 
approved the sale of those 47 un-needed aircraft. Since that time, both Aero Vodochody 
and the Czech Armed Forces have been trying to sell the aircraft. Moreover, the Czech 
Armed Forces pay CZK 4.0 million monthly for storage of these excess aircraft in Aero 
V odochody‟s hangars.66 The military expended a total of CZK 42.6 billion to acquire 
                                                 
63 Act No: 59/2000 Coll., on public support. 
64 www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/l-159.htm (accessed June 16, 2006). 
65 http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=6520 (accessed June 16, 2006). 
66 MoD signed the contract with Aero Vodochody on February 28,  2006, 
http://aktualne.centrum.cz/domaci/bezpecnost-a-doprava, (accessed on August 29, 2006). 
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these aircraft. In relation to the aircraft acquisition, the government had also ordered (ZVI 
Vsetin Co.) and partially funded a controversial project of the research and development 
of the PLAMEN aircraft cannon. It had also awarded a contract worth CZK 400 million 
for the development of a flight simulator for this aircraft without a proper selection 
procedure.67 
A similar procedure had been used in the case of the modernization of T-72 tanks. 
In 1995, selection procedures had commenced to find the suppliers of modernization 
components, counting on the adjustment of up to 353 of these tanks for military 
purposes.68 The army had then ordered the modernization of 250 tanks, but reported in 
2003 that it would only use 30 of them and keep another five for spare parts. However, 
the D efense M inister stated that the arm y w ould keep “80 percent of the m odernized 
tanks to support national industry and its exporting efforts, and 20 percent for the 
necessary training.”69 The costs of modernizing the definitive number of tanks, according 
to a contract concluded with the state-owned Military Repair Enterprise 025 in 2001 
should have been approximately CZK 6 billion. However, this figure did not include the 
previous government investments in research and development.70  
2. Lack of Control Over R&D Subsidies 
Standards for the provision of public support for research and development, 
stipulating the terms and conditions for public tenders, and introducing substantial 
elements of public control into the system, are formulated in the R&D Support Act.71 
However, in the field of defense acquisition, the act allows the Ministry of Defense to 
avoid disclosing the terms of public tenders in certain situations. Such a procedure 
requires the previous consent of the Research and Development Council (RDC).72  In 
2003, the RDC drafted their opinions on R&D programs, namely to public tender 
                                                 
67 Military awarded contract for 400 million without tender, Hospodarske noviny, December 18, 2003.  
68 www.army.cz/mo/tisk/areport/2002/5/7.htm  (accessed June 16, 2006). 
69 Armed Forces: Small and Professional, Hospodarske Noviny, July 11, 2003. 
70 www.army.cz/mo/tisk/areport/2002/5/7.htm  (accessed June 16, 2006). 
71 Research & Development Support Act No. 130/2002 Coll. 
72 Act 130/2002 Coll., Article 17, Section 6. 
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proposals in research & development, including the proposals for defense R&D programs 
“P rofessionalization of the C zech M ilitary” and “R eform  of A rm ed F orces in the C zech 
Republic”, presented by the M inistry of D efense.  T he C ouncil also presents the 
government with an annual analysis and evaluation of the state of R&D in the Czech 
Republic, comparing them to the situation abroad.  The analysis states that when 
investigating the practical use of applied R&D projects, the MoD recorded the most 
unexploited project results. Also, the majority of projects commissioned by the MoD had 
not achieved the anticipated results, and the majority of projects had remained 
unexploited due to the MoD's lack of interest in the project results (27 projects) and due 
to insufficient funds (22 projects).73  The report does not make clear whether any 
conclusions have been drawn from this indicator. 
In November 2003, the government adopted a general document concerning the 
focus of future defense R&D programs in the context of professionalization of the Czech 
military and reform of the Czech Armed Forces. It also ordered the Ministry of Defense 
to invite tenders for the various programs, and award contracts in accordance with the 
Public Procurement Act.74 
3. Indirect Subsidies 
Indirect subsidies are the most widespread, if least visible, forms of assistance 
provided to private enterprise and other institutions. Indirect subsidies may take such 
forms as favorable tax policies, loans, import quotas, and price supports. Indirect public 
subsidies to state co-owned companies active in defense production include the 
government taking over guarantees for those companies' loans. In 1998, the government 
decided to undertake a government guarantee for the loans of Aero Vodochody, a. s., 
manufacturer of the L-159 aircraft. In February 2004, the government realized that Aero 
Vodochody was not doing well and admitted that the impact on the government budget 
                                                 
73 “A nalysis of the D evelopm ent and the S tate of the R esearch and D evelopm ent in the C zech 
Republic, Comparison with Foreign Countries, and a Proposal of the Preparation Procedure for the new 
N ational R esearch and D evelopm ent P olicy of the C zech R epublic for the P eriod from  2003 to 2008”, 
Government Resolution No. 516, May 22, 2002. 
74 Resolution No. 1133, November 12, 2003 of the Government of the Czech Republic on the 
programs of defense R&D and development for the professionalization of the Army of the Czech Republic 
and on the Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. 
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caused by the payment of the company's obligations due to the state guarantee may reach 
up to CZK 3.3 billion in 2004, and up to CZK 6 billion in 2005. The government had also 
decided to initiate negotiations with Boeing concerning its withdrawal from Aero 
Vodochody and to find a new strategic partner in order to facilitate the company's 
restructuring.  A new act on budgetary rules came into force in 2000,75 substantially 
restructuring the possibilities of the uncontrolled taking over of state guarantees, 
stipulating that each individual case must be approved by the Czech government, and 
subsequently adopted as an act of the Parliament. Regardless of that, the Supreme Audit 
Office (SAO) claims that the Czech legal system continues to lack a satisfactory 
definition of non-standard government guarantees, thereby providing a wide opportunity 
for their abuse. 
4. Transparency of Public Support of Exports 
The author of this thesis already mentioned the public support of the production 
and export of arms through awarding unnecessary contracts. The Czech Armed Forces 
keep ordering arms that they either do not need for their own activities, or need a much 
smaller quantity, explaining that it is important for improvement of exporting possibilities 
for certain products of domestic companies (e.g., Tatra trucks for the Czech armed 
forces).76  Not surprisingly, commercial entities as well as the Czech government 
representatives support defense export. However, there are no records of funds spent for 
such promotion (including the expenses of private business representatives traveling 
together with official delegations) or the number of such activities, let alone the number 
of businessmen participating in such missions.77  There is no comprehensive information 
on the number of cases where Czech representatives lobbied in favor of Czech arms 
trading companies in meetings with their foreign partners. 
 
 
                                                 
75 Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, Act 218/2000 Coll., on Budgetary Rules. 
76 C esky R ozhlas, “C zech  arm y to buy T atra trucks”, http://www.radio.cz/en/news/68609 (accessed 
September 19, 2006). 
77 It is happening on alm ost a regular basis. N ot only the D efense M inister‟s visits abroad, but also 
visits of the Prime Minister and the President of the Czech Republic are accompanied by businessmen.  
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a. Insufficient Parliamentary Control 
Debate over public support of defense export is not at the level its 
importance deserves. Until now, only a few isolated deputies or senators have protested 
in the media against the export of Czech arms into countries such as Somalia or Georgia. 
The deputies have not had the opportunity to discuss the national reports on arms 
transactions executed and debate the policy for controlling arms trade. Neither of the 
chambers has yet reviewed annual reports on trading in small arms published so far. 
Unlike deputies in other European countries, such as Sweden, the Czech politicians may 
not advise the executive bodies in controversial cases of granting permits for planned 
arms exports. Until recently, it was not even clear which parliamentary body or 
committee could control arms export.78 
b. Revolving Door Syndrome 
A serious phenom enon, know n as the “R evolving D oor” syndrom e, has 
been experienced in the Czech military.  This involves situations where former 
government officials or military officers retire to jobs in private companies in fields of 
their specialization in the public service, for example, participation of retired military 
officers in private companies supplying the Czech Armed Forces.  Several foreign studies 
have warned that such cases help create mutually dependent personal networks or lead to 
conflicts of interest, where responsible behavior of such officials is difficult to enforce.79 
An example of the revolving door syndrome from the Czech Military 
would be case of the former chief of the General Staff who retired from the military in 
2002. The media reported that less than a year later he founded Generals Ltd., a company 
specializing in commercial consultancy to companies wishing to get military contracts.80  
His company organized a tour for senior executives of the US company General 
                                                 
78 In attempt to increase the parliamentary control over military equipment export, the Chamber of 
D eputies‟ C om m ittee for F oreign A ffairs established its S ubcom m ittee  on Foreign Economic Relation and 
Control over Military Equipment Trade on June 2, 2005. However, the last known meeting was on June 21, 
2005, http://www.mzv.cz/servis/soubor.asp?id=19677 (accessed August 1, 2006).  
79 Catherine Courtney: Corruption in the Official Arms Trade. Policy Research Paper 001, April 2002, 
Transparency International UK, edited by: Laurence Cockcroft and David Murray. 
80 T om as H orejsi, “F orm er C hief of the G eneral S taff A dv ise Companies on How to Sell to the Czech 
M ilitary,” E U R O , F ebruary 2, 2004.    
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Dynamics to meet top military officers and MoD officials. General Dynamics was 
interested securing in a contract for 243 armored transporters, worth approximately CZK 
25 billion (at that time). In relation to this contract, Generals Ltd. employed two other 
retired generals.  Another well-known example of the involvement of former military 
officers in arms trading or manufacturing companies is the former air force commander 
who became, after his retirement from the military,81 an employee of the most important 
arms producing company in the Czech Republic, Aero Vodochody.  
Currently, the “R evolving D oor” syndrom e is not addressed by law . T he 
issue was even not included in the act82 guiding the conditions for obtaining retirement 
benefits, severance payment and settlement for professional military members. Members 
of the government further failed to address the issue in the Public Interest Protection Act, 
the Conflict of Interests Act or any other mechanisms that may protect the country from 
the above mentioned syndrome. 
c. Transparency in Managing of Arms Excess 
S ince the governm ental “divorce” in the form er C zechoslovakia, the 
Czech Armed Forces have been reducing extensively their military armaments and 
technology. This reduction has been prompted by the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, modernization of the Czech Armed Forces, and the Reform of the 
Czech Armed Forces. However, the MoD is not able to provide comprehensive statistical 
data concerning the volume of surplus reserves it has disposed of, and of the volume 
resold to private entities for further exportation abroad. According to the Czech Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, between the years 2003 and 2005 the Czech Republic exported/sold 
weapons at the total cost of approximately EUR 173 million.83 
The author of this thesis sees another issue in the above-mentioned 
exports, particularly in selling weapons to countries such as Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, 
                                                 
81 Military Getting Influence at the MoD and Private Sector, Hospodarske Noviny, September 25, 
2003. 
82 Act No. 221/1999 Coll., on Professional Soldiers, as amended. 
83 Czech Ministry of F oreign A ffairs, “R eport on E xport of M ilitary E quipm ent and W eapons in 
2005,” http://www.mzv.cz/servis (accessed June 16, 2006). 
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N igeria, etc. T he practice is, in the author‟s belief, against the E uropean C ode of C onduct 
on Arms Export (ECCAE).84  Based on various national security sources, the excess 
military materials have constituted the majority of both legal and illegal exports from the 
Czech Republic. 
d. Licensing Issues 
T he C zech R epublic‟s defense exports are subject to a tw o -tier licensing 
process. Private companies wishing to sell, offer, advertise, or purchase military material 
have to first obtain a general license issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, based 
on the consent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the 
Ministry of Interior, and which may be granted only to legal entities registered in the 
Czech Republic in which Czech citizens hold a majority stake and which possess 
sufficient technical and financial resources. Furthermore, vetting by the National Security 
Authority (NSU) is required for senior company executives. The companies that obtain 
the permit must then apply for a special license for each export. Export licenses are 
issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, following a consultation with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, which has to assess the application with regard to foreign policy 
consequences and a proof of the end purpose. In case of the export of important military 
material, the license application has to be reviewed by the Ministry of Defense as well. 
Mainly due to the security measures adopted following the terrorist attacks 
in September 2001, the current control system has been revised several times in recent 
years. The Central Crisis Headquarters established an investigation committee within the 
National Action Plan for Combating Terrorism,85 in order to ascertain whether Czech 
companies were involved in supply chains providing military materials to terrorist 
groups. 
Later, in 2003, the government ordered the Ministries of Industry and 
Trade, Interior, and Defense to submit their evaluations of the functioning of the existing 
                                                 
84 E uropean U nion, “E uropean U nion C ode of C onduct on A rm s E xports,” June 5, 1998, 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs ( accessed August 1, 2006).  
85 T he G overnm ent of the C zech R epublic D ecree N o. 385, “N ational A ction P lan for C om bating 
T errorism ,” adopted on A pril 10, 2002. 
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control regime for foreign trade of military material. In July 2003, a series of measures 
proposed by the final document were adopted.86 The decision was made to include 
supervisory board members in companies applying for a foreign trade permit for military 
materials, within the group of persons subject to security audits. The government also 
extended the deadlines by which the Ministries have to issue their opinion on the license 
application. Moreover, it requires the Ministry of Industry and Trade to immediately 
notify the Ministry of Interior of all license applications received, and allows the Ministry 
of Interior to refuse an application should the export concerned threaten national security 
interests. It also requires the Ministry of Industry and Trade to establish an information 
exchange between the Ministry and the EU bodies concerning denials (denied export 
licenses). 
All of the above measures represent a step in the right direction. 
Strengthening the internal control mechanisms of the authorities involved, standardizing 
the decision-making process and extending the scope of information-sharing between the 
ministries throughout the licensing procedure, which has been somewhat problematic so 
far, represents the right direction. In spite of all of these measures, certain problems 
remain. 
Czech authorities have considered the establishment of a central registry 
of all administrative sanctions, recording the offences of companies and individuals 
against the administrative law, for a long time. The analysis of options for establishing a 
registry of certain administrative sanctions, provided by the Ministry of Interior, 
identified the creation of such a register as the key step among anti-corruption measures. 
However, it is not clear when such a registry will be established, or even if it should be 
established. At present, there is no source of information concerning arms trade that 
would provide the relevant record of past offences of the entities involved, thus enabling 
the bodies involved in the license procedure, export supervision, or procurement 
procedure to obtain important information to prevent possible unfair conduct or repeated 
offences of such entities. Within the existing license procedure, similar databases are 
                                                 
86 The Government of the Czech Republic Resolution No. 685, July 9, 2003. 
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maintained by various authorities (Ministry of Industry and Trade Licensing 
Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Customs Service of the Ministry of 
Finance), but they are not shared. This prevents both proper control and systemization of 
the public authorities' decision-making process. 
A recent incident, thoroughly discussed in the media and raising questions 
concerning the authorities' impartiality and adherence to clearly defined rules in licensing 
procedures, was the attempt to export Vera passive surveillance systems into the People's 
Republic of China. Omnipol, the Czech arms export company, obtained a permit to 
export the systems in the middle of January 2004, despite the fact that the EU has 
imposed an arms export embargo on China. The Czech government has finally decided 
on 20 May that the respective Ministry should withdraw the export permit granted for 
foreign policy reasons.87  
None of the measures adopted to date, not even the government 
amendment of the Act on Trading in Military Material,88 attempt to reduce the risks of 
illegal exports concerning re-export to other countries by establishing a procedure of 
performance audit of the end user stated in the export permit application after a certain 
time period, and the imposition of automatic sanctions on both the exporter and the 
customer for violations of permit conditions. 
e. Public Control 
As the author already mentioned, the licensing as well as the arms export 
in recent years have called for attention of media and NGOs. However, due to the lack of 
information concerning licensing procedures provided by public authorities in recent 
years, public debate was limited. 
Since 2000, the transparency of the arms trade in the Czech Republic has 
greatly improved due to publication of an annual report on the export and import of small 
arms.89 This and other reports in the subsequent years have been drafted by the 
                                                 
87 R adio P rague, “G overnm ent to H alt E xport of R adar S ystem  to C hina,” M ay 20, 2004. 
88 Act No 38/1994 Coll., on Foreign Trade in Military Material. 
89 The Government of the Czech Republic Resolution No. 138, November 20, 2000. The following 
year, the Resolution No. 189/2001 was adopted considering the 2000 report. This report did not include 
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interdepartmental working group for small arms, and issued by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The reports analyze the approach of the Czech Republic toward international 
negotiations concerning small arms owned by firearm license holders in the Czech 
Republic. However, they fail to report data on the number of small arms owned by the 
Czech Armed Forces. Similar limitations apply to the information on production, 
permitted exports and permit denials. 
The above-mentioned information represented a breakthrough in 
improving transparency of government authorities towards the public -- their scope was 
limited to only one category of military equipment (i.e., small arms and light weapons). 
Therefore, in 2004 the Government decided to publish a national annual report covering 
exports of all military equipment in a given period, whereby the quantity and quality of 
provided information would correspond to broadly shared standards within the European 
U nion. T he first report of this kind entitled “Control of Exports in the Czech Republic in 
2003” w as published in D ecem ber 2004. 
3. Czech Participation in International Organizations Fighting 
Corruption 
Unfortunately, corruption is witnessed all over the world, and therefore is 
involved also in international business relationships. High risk of corruption for that 
reason, at least in the recent years, has been the centre of attention of both international 
and intergovernmental organizations. The Czech Republic has joined a number of 
international initiatives and mechanisms to prevent corruption in this field. In 2000, the 
Czech Republic acceded to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions;90 in 2002, the Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe came into force,91 followed by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
data on small arms and light weapons in service with the Czech Armed Forces and armed corps. These data 
were classified under Act No. 148/1998 to regulate classified information and to amend certain other laws 
and regulations and Government Directive No. 246/1998. 
 
90 O E C D , “C onvention on C om bating B ribery of F oreign P ublic O fficials in International B usiness 
T ransactions,” entered into force on February 15, 1999, http://www.oecd.org (accessed July 1, 2006). 
91 C ouncil of E urope, “C rim inal L aw  C onvention on C orruption,” entered into force on July 1, 2002, 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty (accessed July 1, 2006).  
 62 
Civil Law Convention on Corruption in 2004. The Czech Republic has also joined the 
Group of States against Corruption, working under the Council of Europe. In 2006, the 
Council issued a number of recommendations particularly for the Czech Republic, which 
were aimed at reducing corruption, such as restriction of the parliamentary immunity of 
the Czech deputies against criminal prosecution, money laundering, etc.92  However, the 
Czech Republic has not yet joined several important international mechanisms and it has 
not ratified the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. One of the 
reasons for not ratifying is the non-existence in the Czech law of the criminal liability of 
legal entities, which is required by the text of the Convention. The Czech Republic finally 
signed93 the UN Convention against Corruption, adopted by the UN General Assembly, 




                                                 
92 C ouncil of E urope, G roup of S tates against C orruption, “E valuation R eport on the C zech R epublic,” 
May 12, 2006. 
93 The UN Convention Against Corruption was signed by the Czech Republic on April 22, 2005, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_signatures_corruption.html (accessed June 22, 2006). 
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V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a summary and conclusions regarding the issues the Czech 
Republic faces concerning offsets in the context of military purchases and international 
trade. This chapter draws conclusion from the analysis and provides recommendations 
regarding changes in Czech Government policy and practices towards offsets. The 
summary concludes with areas for further research. 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Offsets represent reciprocal economic advantages that result from trade 
agreements.  Nowadays, due to increasing competition among suppliers, the reduced 
global defense market, declining military budgets, and other aspects, buyers are able to 
influence the conditions under which major defense programs are obtained.  Therefore, 
offsets are used predominantly in a sense of variety of industrial, commercial and 
political arrangements under which foreign suppliers implement specific actions aimed at 
partially or fully com pensating the buyer‟s procurem en t cost.  The Czech Republic seeks 
these compensations in full for the direct cost of procuring major defense programs. 
These offset practices, however, do not fit the free trade principles and create barriers to 
free trade. 
Better economic infrastructure, health service, and social aspects of a particular 
country are usually seen behind implementation of different offsets.  Fulfillment of offset 
agreement is usually achieved through various projects realized in the buying country, 
and very often together with third parties, and often in the form of technological transfer, 
license, and mutual interest.  These projects also offer the possibility of global expansion 
for small businesses. 
Besides the buying government and seller, there is a wide variety of stakeholders 
involved in some degrees with offsets and their implementation.  Unions, defense 
industries, trade associations, and the public are among some of them.   
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Some countries, such as the Czech Republic, strongly support offsets 
implementation as indispensable to making a business.  Others view offsets as an 
inevitable obstacle.  Given these views, offsets are quite controversial. Some areas of 
controversies might be transactional cost to implement offset, negative effects on 
unemployment, and security issues.  
1. Summary of the Economic Environment of the Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic is one of the most stable and prosperous of the post-
Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. T he C zech R epublic‟s econom ic 
growth performance has continuously been improving and now compares favorably with 
other countries in the region. It has a stable currency, low unemployment (7.3% in June 
2006), and low national debt (CZK 728.9 billion in July 2006, nominal value). Gross 
Domestic Product grew by 7.4 percent in first quarter of 2006, and is estimated to stay in 
the range of six to seven percent in 2006 and 2007. The inflation rate in July 2006 was 
2.4%. Low inflation and interest rates have been a strong point of the economy for recent 
years and also policy is well prepared to meet the monetary challenges of Euro entry 
which is scheduled for 2010. However, the next government will face considerable 
challenges in achieving fiscal sustainability. Currently, three months after the 
parliamentary election in the Czech Republic, it is still not clear whether the country will 
have a stable Government, and who it is going to be. Challenges also remain in 
improving administrative processes, overcoming shortcomings in specific areas of 
business legislation and dealing with corruption.   
The Czech Republic became the first former Warsaw Pact member to join the 
O E C D  in 1995, and the first to be given an A  rating by S tandard and P oor‟s. Czechs were 
am ong the founding fathers of the U .N ., IM F , W orld B ank and G A T T  but the “iro n 
curtain” did not allow  the country to be present at the birth of N A T O . H ow ever, in 1999 
the Czech Republic finally became a NATO member. In 2004, the Czech Republic 
became a member of the EU as well. The country also offers an excellent central 
European location and a highly skilled w ork force. T he country‟s overall 
macroeconomic, political, and social stability create an attractive investment climate for 
foreign investment and trade. 
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2. Offset Policy  
Offset policy has been implemented into the procurement programs of the Czech 
Republic since the year 1998, when the Czech Government issued its first decree (Decree 
No. 421/1998) that stated conditions for application of offset requirements. Gaining 
experience, especially from work on the supersonic aircraft procurement contract, 
required a considerable amount of flexibility in reaching the agreement from both the 
procurement staff and the contractor. The Ministry of Industry and Trade therefore, using 
that experience, prepared a new decree (Decree No. 9/2005), and following the decree, 
the MIT issued its order (Order No.3/2005) that detailed the governmental decree. 
In short, the implementation of offsets, or industrial cooperation programs, has 
never been regulated by a special law in the Czech Republic. It is regulated by 
government decree and is binding on all government organizations and bodies 
performing procurement through state budget. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of the 
Czech Republic is the keeper of the industrial cooperation policy. 
3. Offset Regulations 
There are four main principles for offset transactions in the Czech Republic 
provided in Table 6. 
Table 4.   Principles for Offset Transactions 
1. To apply compensation transactions to direct deliveries exceeding CZK 500 
million (+/- EUR 16.6 million), or sub deliveries exceeding CZK 250 million (+/- 
EUR 8.3 million) of equipment, materials and services for defense and security 
purposes from abroad 
2. The compensation to constitute at least 100% of contract value with at least 20% 
of the direct offsets 
3. Maximum length of the program to be 10 years 
4. Condition for participation in a public tender 
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Direct Offset Transactions shall account for at least 20 percent of the purchase 
price of the subject matter of the public contract in question, which is charged to the 
foreign contractor or subcontractor. 
The requirement for the implementation of an offset program in the framework of 
a public contract is generally formulated as an indispensable condition for taking part in a 
public tender or, if just one contractor is addressed, an indispensable condition of the 
performance of the public contract. 
4. Principal Participants in the Process of Industrial Cooperation 
Programs 
There are several key players in the ICP. At the stage of contract negotiation, the 
key players are the MoD on one side and the winner of the competition on the other. 
These two players therefore maintain the legal relationship as long as the offset 
agreement is in effect. The MoD represents the Czech Republic and has the final word in 
approval of the final value of particular offset transactions. 
Another key relationship is between the contractor and the Czech industry. 
Professional associations, such as the Defense Industry Association (DIA), can represent 
the industry. The government does not declare where the offsets should be directed, nor 
does it select the Czech partner of the offset transaction. It is a responsibility of the 
Contractor to research capabilities of the Czech industry and to find the suitable partner. 
Once the contractor with the selected Czech partner come to the agreement, they together 
develop the offset transaction proposal and the contractor submits the proposal to the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade. The MIT presents the proposal to the Offset 
Commission.   
This Offset Commission is an intergovernmental body, whose members have the 
delegated authority to approve the submitted transaction. The Commission itself consists 
of representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
for Regional Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministries of Defense and of 
Interior as representatives of the state in the offset agreement. The MIT is the only body 
that has a total overview on all programs and all transactions. 
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In the effort of foreign commercial partners to look for transaction opportunities, 
the Czech side does not set up any specific requirement (industrial, branch nor regional) 
for the individual offset programs nor transactions.  
The carefully formulated agreement is the key to the good relationship between 
the MoD and the contractor. The Industrial Cooperation Agreement should be signed at 
the same time as the related delivery contract. 
 
5. Czech Gripen Program – A Successful Story (So Far) 
The Agreement on the Industrial Cooperation Program has been signed for a 
period from June 14, 2004 through December 31, 2014. This period represents more than 
10 years. The offset obligation represents 130% of the Gripen aircraft lease, of which 
20% represents the direct offsets. In absolute figures, the offset obligation is CZK 25.5 
billion. 
Although most of these offset transactions will generate a value in the future, the 
Czech MoD has already approved the second annual Offset Performance Report, which 
claims that after about two years into the ten year program, the total offset reached CZK 
6.6 billion (26% of the total obligation). Nevertheless, about 3/4 of the overall value of 
the program has yet to be generated. Up to now, it seems that the program will be going 
well in the near future. The latest claim also forwarded new transaction proposals to the 
MIT. 
6. Issues Concerning Offsets and International Trade 
The Czech Republic became an EU member in 2004. Nearly all barriers to trade 
in industrial goods with the EU fell in the course of the accession process, which had a 
positive impact on reform in the Czech Republic, and new EU regulations and directives 
continue to shape the business environment. The Czech Republic was also announced to 
be a fully developed country in 2006. Free trade, as well as stronger regulation and rising 
labor costs, will mean tougher competition for Czech producers in the future.  
H ow ever, the C zech R epublic‟s econom ic transform ation is not yet com plete. T he 
government still faces serious challenges mainly in completing industrial restructuring 
 68 
and increasing transparency. In the annual reports on the implementation of the  
“P rogram  for the F ight against C orruption,” the C zech governm ent has in the past years 
introduced various measures to prevent and fight corruption. In spite of this, corruption 
remains a serious problem, as is evidenced by recent corruption scandals. Therefore, 
further efforts are required in the years to come. To be more specific, the author believes 
that there is an insistent and immediate need to address conflicts of interest, competitive 
hiring of persons employed in the whole public sector, reporting suspicions of corruption 
and satisfactory protection for those who do, and protection of public officials who report 
instances of corruption in good faith.  
As indicated by this thesis, should the Czech government truly wish to succeed in 
combating corruption in the field of the defense trade (and indeed, in other fields as well), 
it needs to implement a number of changes to limit the corruption behavior. Some of the 
most needed and most important measures were introduced in Chapter IV, and their 
summary follows below.  
An amendment to the Public Procurement Act should be implemented to limit the 
number of exemptions from the force of the Act, including the defense and arms trade. 
R estricting the contracting authority‟s free choice of the type of the selection process, 
simplifying the process of proposing reviews of the contracting authority's actions, 
introducing a system allowing for a review by a supervisory body of bid evaluations 
performed by evaluation committees, and introducing active remedies and sanctions for 
the violation of provisions of the PPA, should all be a part of the new amendment. 
Transparency, as well as simplification of the selection process, must be 
improved. The evaluation criteria and contracts as such should remain the same 
throughout the entire selection process. The selection process should always be open and 
simple to the maximum extent, and bid evaluations should not take into consideration 
offset proposals. 
To ensure public access to information on public subsidies of R&D and arms 
sales, the central registry of subsidies should be extended to include information on all 
types of government subsidies. 
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When allocating the Government‟s subsidies, the transparent conditions m ust be 
provided. The Government should favor neither indirect support nor classified support 
over public or parliamentary control. When the Government provides its subsidies via 
awarding unnecessary contracts, the key officials involved shall bear full personal, 
political, or even criminal responsibility. 
Last, but not least, introduction of preliminary and follow-up parliamentary 
defense trade control, as well as publishing of regular detailed reports on arms trade for 
the use of the general public, should follow. 
7. Conclusions 
T he introduction of the C zech R epublic‟s experience w ith defense offsets, 
although limited in scope and depth, can be useful to other countries. The biggest offset 
program in the Czech Republic used as an example for the purpose of this thesis, the 
Gripen Industrial Cooperation Program, proved to be effective in the time this thesis was 
written. 
It is relatively easy to monitor formal fulfillment of offset program in terms of 
contracts signed; however, it is difficult to establish whether these offset transactions are 
the result of the offset arrangements. It is also difficult to evaluate the contribution of 
offsets to the achievement of long-term goals within defense and economic development 
policy due to the multitude of other determinants that can affect these goals. 
The effects of offsets on jobs are a crucially important question because the 
industry contributes so much to total Czech employment: 34% of GDP is an industry 
share, 26% of the total number of employees in the Czech Republic work in industry, 
mostly high-skill, high-wage jobs. The nation would benefit from more of them, and a 
priority policy question is how to generate them. One view holds that offsets generate or 
at least sustain jobs in the C zech R epublic. H ow ever, the author of this thesis didn‟t find 
any proof for supporting this view. More time is needed to evaluate the offset effects on 
employment in the Czech Republic. 
For the public sector, an aging, retirement-eligible workforce means that the 
necessary talent for the future will not be available unless actions are taken to recruit 
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quality employees with requisite skills. For the private sector, the ability to attract new 
talent is directly related to the current business environment. Until potential employees 
look upon the defense industry as a growth sector of the economy, it will continue to 
have difficulty competing with other sectors for the next generation talent it needs. 
However, no sufficient evidence that the offsets improve human capital was found. 
 Technology transfer is the most common type of direct offset in defense 
transactions. Up to 30 per cent of all offsets provided relate to technology transfer of 
varying degree. Most of the buyers want the technology to manufacture the complete 
system, if possible, or at least its sub-assemblies. Although commonly touted as the most 
beneficial offset, its effectiveness remains suspect for many nations. Examples of various 
manufacturers taking the advantage of the Gripen program in the Czech republic show no 
evidence to support the technology transfer. However, not all offset transactions have 
been applied yet, and the Gripen program is still at the beginning. The biggest drawback 
of technology transfer as an offset is that it is very difficult to measure its real impact and 
effectiveness. The Czech Republic, as well as any recipient nation, has to have a 
dedicated set-up to verify and assess the overall benefits. Technology transfer for the sake 
of getting an offset is of no avail.  
The duration of the Industrial Cooperation Program must be also considered when 
assessing the long-term impact of an offset program. Direct offsets are usually 
established for the time period of the contract and so are considered to have a relatively 
short-term economic effect. When the offset program is completed, there is a need to find 
another work for labor, and other use for machinery, equipment, capital, etc. Therefore, it 
is even more difficult to estimate the value of a particular contract. The more an offset 
activity is fitted to an existing strategy, the better results in the future. 
Offsets themselves add complexity to an already complex international trade. The 
more complex the program, the more space it has for a hidden agenda. Maximum effort 




B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTHER RESEARCH 
The research conducted for this thesis investigated the issues the Czech Republic 
face concerning offset implementation in the context of military purchases. Further 
research in the area of the Czech Republic involvement in offsets is warranted, 
particularly identifying alternatives to offsets within the Czech Government that would 
follow and respect principles of free trade. 
Identifying the real total value of the Gripen Industrial Cooperation to the Czech 
Republic and its Armed Forces would also prove valuable. That would require a group of 
knowledgeable people with access to all relevant information, and would also require that 
this group stay with the program for its duration. That would be an extremely difficult 
mission, especially due to the complexity of the offset program. 
Determining costs associated only with the implementation of offset programs 
would be another interesting topic for further research. That would embrace the 
significance of various costs incurred during the offset program implementation by both 
sides. This research would also identify methods of payment and its distribution, as well 
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APPENDIX A 
A. CORRUPTIVE ENVIRONMENT 
1. Introduction 
There are many different definitions of corruption. For the purpose of this 
research the author uses the C zech governm ent‟s definition of corruption: “the abuse of a 
person's office and violation of the impartiality principle in decision-making, motivated 
by a desire of profit. Corruption is a mistake in the decision-making (governing) process. 
The elements of corruption relationship are the decision-maker; the decision-maker's 
power to deviate from prescribed rules; making such a deviated decision in exchange for 
a certain benefit; and the wrongfulness and immorality of such an exchange. The 
capability of institutions to subdue and combat corruption indicates the quality of such 
institutions and of the institutional system  as such.”94 
The risk factors enhancing the danger of corruption are the following: distribution 
of government subsidies; trading restrictions; inconsistent and non-transparent decision-
making of the public bodies; inefficient sanctioning and monitoring mechanisms; lack of 
public and parliamentary control; and the conflict of interests.  
2. Corruption in the Czech Republic  
Early, in 1998, the Czech government had acknowledged the seriousness of 
corruption in the Czech Republic and subsequently defined the fight against corruption as 
one of its priorities.95  In the following year, it adopted96 the Government Program of 
Fighting Corruption, which it has been circulating annually since then. As regards 
indirect corruption criteria, the Czech Republic ranked 47th among world countries with a 
score of 4.3, according to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published by 
Transparency International in 2005. A survey conducted among senior private business 
                                                 
94 Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. 473 of May 19, 2003 concerning the 
Report on Corruption in the Czech Republic and on Meeting the Schedule of Measures adopted under the 
National Program for Combating Corruption. 
95 Statement of Government Policy of the Czech Republic, Prague, August 1998, www.mzv.cz 
(accessed  June 18, 2006). 
96 Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No.125, of February 17, 1999. 
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officials in the developed countries revealed that 38 percent of the respondents believe 
that the highest bribes in their country are being paid in the defense industry. According 
to the US Department of Trade, almost 50 percent of bribes in the U.S. are paid in 
connection with defense industry contracts.97 In the Czech Republic, no such indirect 
quantitative review of corruption in the arms trade has yet been performed. Apart from 
institutional barriers and the extent of the aversion of society to corruption, the total 
scope and level of corruption obviously depend on the total volume of funds involved in 
the respective area of trade. The scope of arms trading in the Czech Republic is nowhere 
near the figures involved in certain developed countries (especially the United States). 
The tables below provide a general overview of the volume of financial transactions in 
Czech domestic and foreign defense trade. However, the outline does not intend to 
suggest that the figures are directly related to the scope of corruption in this industry. 
They should merely serve as a framework for better understanding of the scope and 
importance of the defense trade for the national economy. 
Table 5.   C zech F oreign T rade in A rm s and A m m unition (real value, C S O  didn‟t provide 
with the base year)98 
Year Import (CZK)  Share of Total 
Import (%) 
Export (CZK)  Share of Total 
Export (%) 
2005 1,177,954,000 6.4 2,736,637,000 14.6 
2004 1,065,677,000 6.1 2,428,258,000 14.1 
2003 1,221,943,000 8.5 2,208,868,000 16.1 
2002 559,797,000 4,2 2,425,313,000 19.3 
2001 375,271,000 2.7 2,534,947,000 19.9 
2000 387,489,000 3.1 2,685,771,000 23.9 
 
The most im portant part of the “dom estic” arm s trade is the acquisitions of the 
Czech military. Exact figures are not being published in this field, and the total expenses 
for the procurement of arms and ammunition may only be roughly inferred from the 
Ministry of Defense annual reports, or from reports submitted by the Czech Republic to 
the UN. 
                                                 
97 U S  D epartm ent of C om m erce: “T he N ational E xport S trategy”, T rade P rom otion C oordinating 
Committee Report, March 2000, page 11. 
98 Czech Statistical Office, http://dw.czso.cz/pls/stazo/stazo.stazo (accessed July 17, 2006). 
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Table 6.   Defense Expenditures of the Czech Republic (current year money)99 
Defense Expenditures (CZK billion) 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Ammunition and Arms Procurement 11,103 9,951  9,629  10,232 9,866 
Defense Research & Development 0,486 0,530 0,398 0,396 0,282 
 
There is a certain increase in the volume of arms procurement for the military, in 
connection with the recently launched process of modernization of the Czech military, 
and in connection with the purchase of 199 wheeled armored transporters (worth CZK 




                                                 
99 http://daccessdds.un.org (accessed July 17, 2006). 
100 The Czech Defense Minister signed the contract on June 9, 2006, www.army.cz (accessed  June 
18, 2006). 
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